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ARTICLE
A CHRISTIAN VISION OF FREEDOM AND
DEMOCRACY: NEUTRALITY AS AN OBSTACLE
TO FREEDOM
By: Karen Jordan
Abstract
This article presents the underlying vision for the
argument that principles of liberal neutrality pose a genuine
obstacle to freedom in democratic society. There is a
growing concern that liberty and justice are unattainable in
modern democratic societies that are grounded in
neutrality, including the United States. Experience has
demonstrated significant shortcomings of the modern
freedom movements grounded in political theories,
which—along with the theory of neutrality—reject the need
for core substantive values to guide law and policy. The
underlying basis of such theories is a particular modern
conception of freedom. But a well-grounded and reasoned
alternative vision of human freedom exists: a distinctively
Christian vision of human freedom as understood in light of
the philosophical and theological study of God’s revelation
to man. A comprehensive treatment of the Christian vision
of human freedom can be gleaned from the scholarly work
of Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, currently Pope Emeritus
Benedict XVI. From this alternative perspective, freedom
is promoted and safeguarded only when core substantive
values and moral insights are respected as the point of
reference for law and justice in society, a condition which
posits a role for the State in prudently fostering respect for
those values and insights. Because this alternative vision is
often misunderstood, the purpose of this article is to present
a concise but in-depth synthesis of the writings of
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Ratzinger bearing on human freedom and democracy and to
thereby encourage dialogue leading to a more moderate use
of neutrality principles.
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A Christian Vision of Freedom and Democracy:
Neutrality as an Obstacle to Freedom
“A confused ideology of liberty leads to a dogmatism
that is proving ever more hostile to real liberty.”1
Freedom has been a defining mark of modern and
postmodern thought.
In the areas of science and
technology, as well as the arenas of politics and sociology,
freedom has been the objective. But what is freedom?
What is the best way to think about freedom? In the
modern era, the goals of science and technology have been
to dominate nature, and the political goals have been to
eliminate oppressive governing regimes and to end
injustice and unjust discrimination based on differences in
race, class, and other categorizations. Undoubtedly, many
good things have resulted from these goals. But overall,
the modern freedom movements have proved
unsatisfactory.
In European societies, Marxist-based
political and social theories led to tyranny and human
devastation.
In the United States, the “unitedness”
promised and envisioned has dissipated. And to many,
liberty and justice are no longer perceived as possible
because lawmaking and policy-making have been reduced
to rule by the strongest. The general direction of the
modern quest for freedom surely must be right. An
1

JOSEPH RATZINGER, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CRISIS OF CULTURES 36
(2006). In this book, Ratzinger emphasizes that the main divide in
contemporary society rests on the question of the existence of God. Id.
at 40-45. On the one side lies the great historical and religious cultures
of humanity; on the other side lies a perspective reflecting humanity’s
emancipation from God. In its conclusion, this article affirms that this
divide lies at the heart of the controversy regarding use of the neutrality
principle. The underlying premise of neutrality is a vision of freedom
that, in essence, views family, morality, and God as antitheses to
freedom. These ideas will be discussed in Part I & Part IV(A) of this
paper.
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important question is why the modern approaches to
freedom have gone awry.
To many, the crux of the problem is society’s
reliance on the idea of neutrality, a doctrine central to legal
and political philosophy in the United States today. 2
Modern ideas of liberal neutrality rest on the premise that
the state should not express preferences regarding
substantive values or competing conceptions of good or,
more specifically, the end toward which citizens should
strive. 3 This is because, in the liberal tradition, judgments
2

See, e.g., JAMES KALB, THE TYRANNY OF LIBERALISM:
UNDERSTANDING AND OVERCOMING ADMINISTERED FREEDOM,
INQUISITORIAL TOLERANCE, AND EQUALITY BY COMMAND (2d ed.
2008); ROBERT H. DIERKER JR, THE TYRANNY OF TOLERANCE: A
SITTING JUDGE BREAKS THE CODE OF SILENCE TO EXPOSE THE LIBERAL
JUDICIAL ASSAULT (2006). See also CATHOLICISM, LIBERALISM, AND
COMMUNITARIANISM (Kenneth L. Grasso, Gerard V. Bradley & Robert
P. Hunt eds. 1995).
3
See, e.g., John M. Breen, Neutrality in Liberal Legal Theory and
Catholic Social Thought, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 513, 513-97
(2009) (providing a comparative analysis of neutrality and Catholic
social teaching). Breen explains that neutrality is widely considered a
defining feature and virtue of that strand of American political
philosophy referred to as liberalism; and that liberalism has provided
the intellectual foundation for much of the American legal system. Id.
at 514-15 & 517 (citing and quoting a number of influential works). See
also WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND
DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1991). In America, the neutrality
approach is perhaps most properly attributable to John Rawls. Rawls
rejected the idea that a “general moral conception” can provide the
basis for a “public conception of justice” in a democratic society. He
advocated instead for an approach that rests on the “overlapping
consensus” of a particular culture. See John Rawls, Justice as Fairness:
Political not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 225 (1985),
available
at
http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/rarneson/Courses/RawlsJustic
e.pdf In his mind, this was because “we – we modern inheritors of the
traditions of religious tolerance and constitutional government – put
liberty ahead of perfection.” See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971).
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concerning what is good, the ends in life worthy of pursuit,
are subjective; no conception of what is good exists that
would warrant attempts to coerce dissenters.4 Being
neutral means that all values and viewpoints are regarded
as equal.5
Scholars have pointed out deficiencies
associated with the principle of neutrality. For example,
they say that it is unworkable and illusory to the point of
being deceptive.6 But this creates a new question: if
society needs substantive values to guide policy-making,
what values should be selected? This is the stumbling
block for many people.
In the United States, significant support exists for
the idea that core Christian values should provide the
foundation for law and justice. Indeed, for much of the
history of the United States, Christian values were the
foundation for society. It is only because of the neutrality
principle—especially as imposed by the United States
Supreme Court in the arena of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence7—that the idea has been increasingly
quashed. In a recent Establishment Clause case, Justice
4

Breen, supra note 3, at 525-26 (drawing on ANDREW ALTMAN,
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE (1990)). Breen notes
that “because the nature of the good is unsettled, contested, and always
open to dispute, liberalism holds that it is never appropriate to use the
coercive power of the state to mandate a particular theory of the good.”
Id. at 526.
5
See Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 CALIF. L. REV.
305, 311-12 (1990) (explaining neutrality as advocated in Bruce
Ackerman’s theory of liberal justice and Ronald Dworkin’s theory of
rights).
6
See, e.g., id. As explained by Dean Steven Smith, neutrality is
illusory and impotent. It cannot guide public policy; cannot garner
respect of citizens; and, in fact, operates in a way that is deceptive to
the public. Id. at 313-29. Cf. Galston, supra note 3, at 3-21. The
citations in footnote 2 above also address this idea.
7
See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
(landmark case in which the Supreme Court adopted the neutrality
principle in the context of the Establishment Clause).
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O’Connor, an advocate of the view that it is impermissible
for state action to give rise to even a subtle feeling of
exclusion (i.e., to make a person aware that his or her
religious views might be out of sync with more mainstream
religious views), suggested that reconsidering use of the
neutrality principle was unthinkable. After noting the
existence of strong religious sentiments in the United
States, which she attributes to judicial enforcement of the
form of neutrality that cabins religious views to the private
realm, Justice O’Connor essentially stated: “Why would we
want any other approach?”8
Importantly, however, if the principle of neutrality
itself is misguided—if “unitedness” has been lost and
democratic government has been reduced to rule by the
strongest—the idea that core Christian values should
provide a foundation for law and justice should be rejected
only for sound substantive reasons. A key purpose of this
article is to explain why acceptance of core Christian
values as guideposts can better safeguard liberty and
justice. A sound argument exists that liberty and justice in
society depend on state recognition of, and prudent use of,
core Christian values in policy-making.9 In response to
8

See McCreary Cnty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 545 U.S. 844, 882
(2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor had pointed to
violence in other areas of the world resulting from “assumption of
religious authority by government.” She then states: “Those who
would renegotiate the boundaries between church and state must
therefore answer a difficult question: Why would we trade a system
that has served us so well for one that has served others so poorly?” Id.
Her line of reasoning suggests a failure to appreciate that moving away
from neutrality does not mean “assumption of religious authority by
government.” Rather, it would entail government respect for a source
of moral authority beyond the state, which means that it would be
beyond the majority vote.
9
This would not necessarily mean a return to state practices struck
down by the Court due to Establishment Clause concerns. Past reliance
on Christian values in fashioning laws may not always have been
“prudent” and may have involved values beyond the realm
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Justice O’Connor’s question, society should want another
approach because, in the quest for freedom, how humans
live does matter.
Notably, the case for a more tempered use of
neutrality has been persuasively presented in the work of
Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, currently Pope Emeritus
Benedict XVI.10 In addressing freedom and democracy,
Ratzinger’s focus has mainly been on the situation in
Europe.11 But his message is relevant to any society
hoping to maintain a pluralistic democracy where liberty
and justice are possible. The crux of Ratzinger’s message
is that freedom is promoted and safeguarded only when
core Christian moral insights are respected as the
foundation and point of reference for law and justice.
Regarding the interaction between Christianity and political
authority in a pluralistic democracy, Ratzinger’s
philosophy perhaps is best captured by the statement that
democracy must be lived “on the basis of Christianity and
Christianity on the basis of the free democratic state.”12
appropriately considered “core values.” Cf. JOSEPH RATZINGER,
VALUES IN A T IME OF UPHEAVAL 21-22 (2006) (noting that Christians
have at times in the past expected too much from the “earthly city”).
10
Because the bulk of the writings considered in this article were
written by Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger before he was elected Pope, this
paper uses the name Ratzinger in both the text of the paper and in
citations.
11
See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, EUROPE TODAY AND TOMORROW:
ADDRESSING THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES (Michael J. Miller trans.,
Ignatius Press 2d ed. 2007) (2004). See also JOSEPH RATZINGER AND
MARCELLO PERA, WITHOUT ROOTS: THE WEST, RELATIVISM,
CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM (2007); JOSEPH RATZINGER, A TURNING POINT
FOR EUROPE? THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD: ASSESSMENT AND
FORECAST (Brian McNeil trans., Ignatius Press, 2d ed. 1994) (1991)
[hereinafter Ratzinger, A Turning Point].
12
JOSEPH RATZINGER, A Christian Orientation in a Pluralistic
Democracy?: The Indispensability of Christianity in the Modern Age,
in CHURCH, ECUMENISM & POLITICS: NEW ESSAYS IN ECCLESIOLOGY
204, 215 (Robert Nowell trans., Crossroad Pub. Co. 1st Am. Ed.1988)
(1987) [hereinafter Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation].
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The first half of this statement of course meets strong
resistance in today’s culture. Nonetheless, Ratzinger has
been adamant that, although the distinct spheres of Church
and State must be respected,13 a society electing a
democratic government must recognize as inviolable a
certain basic set of values and those values having a
Christian foundation.14 To Ratzinger, the existence of these
values was a precondition for democracy, and adherence to
these values is necessary for the survival of democracy.15
13

See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, Theology and the Church’s Political
Stance, in CHURCH, ECUMENISM & POLITICS: NEW ESSAYS IN
ECCLESIOLOGY, supra note 12, at 152, 161-62 [hereinafter Ratzinger,
Political Stance] (noting that where the Church itself becomes the state,
freedom becomes lost; but, also, that freedom is lost when the Church
is precluded from being a public and publically relevant authority).
Ratzinger has also acknowledged that, in the past, the Church has at
times overstepped its bounds. The Church at times has expected too
much from civil society in terms of the Christian norms it expected to
be recognized by the state and, at times, has over-asserted its claim to
public legal status. See, e.g., Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra
note 12, at 212-13.
14
Ratzinger explains that Christianity provides the rational foundation
for ethics; ethics remains rational only when reason is purified by faith;
and a Christian foundation “is imperative precisely if [the state] is to
remain the state and pluralist.” Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation,
supra note 12, at 216-18. The necessary purification of reason by faith
(and vice versa) occurs within the context of Christianity and the
Church. See Ratzinger, Political Stance, supra note 13, at 158-60. As
explained below, truth exists in the world because it is a product of the
Eternal Reason that is Love, also known as God. Humans have access
to the truth, but only with the assistance of revelation from God. The
Church, understood in its fullness, is the “place where [Truth] is
perceived.” Id. at 160.
15
“The state must recognize that a basic framework of values with a
Christian foundation is the precondition for its existence. It must in
this sense as it were simply recognize its historical place, the ground
from which it cannot completely free itself without collapsing. It must
learn that there is a continued existence of truth which is not subject to
consensus but which precedes it and makes it possible.” Ratzinger, A
Christian Orientation, supra note 12, at 219. Ratzinger also stresses
that democracy was formulated precisely to preserve inviolable values
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Because it is largely a matter of historical fact that
Christian values were a precondition for democracy,16 the
more controversial assertion is the claim that moral insights
from the Christian tradition are necessary for the survival
of democracy.
Indeed, this perspective may be
incomprehensible to persons influenced by the pervasively
secular culture present in contemporary society. But the
perspective is challenging to understand even for Christians
and others who would be open to the idea.
For that reason, in this article I strive to help make
this perspective of freedom and democracy comprehensible
and, in particular, to do so largely using the work of
Cardinal Ratzinger.17 It is useful and appropriate to focus
on Ratzinger’s scholarly writings for a number of reasons.
Ratzinger is recognized for his strong intellectual
capabilities and his ability to communicate his ideas clearly
and succinctly.18 His writings also reveal a genuine attempt
and rights. See JOSEPH RATZINGER, What is Truth, in VALUES IN A
TIME OF UPHEAVAL 55 (2006).
16
Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra note 12, at 215 n. 11
(While democracy is a product of the fusion of Greek and Christian
heritage, it was, more specifically, “formed under the particular
conditions of the American Congregationalist pattern;” it is not a
product of the so-called Enlightenment era, nor of the European
Reformation movement).
17
Ratzinger’s ideas and teaching on human freedom and democratic
society are fully consistent with Catholic teaching generally, especially
as presented in important papal encyclicals and instructions addressing
Catholic social doctrine. See, e.g., J. BRIAN BENESTAD, CHURCH,
STATE, AND SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION TO CATHOLIC SOCIAL
DOCTRINE (2011) (presenting Catholic social doctrine, but also usefully
integrating the particular contributions of various popes, including Pope
Benedict XVI). See generally MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING:
COMMENTARIES & INTERPRETATIONS, (Kenneth R. Himes et al. eds.,
2005).
18
See, e.g., D. VINCENT TWOMEY, THE ESSENTIAL POPE BENEDICT
XVI: HIS CENTRAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES xvii-xix (John F.
Thornton & Susan B. Varenne eds.,HarperOne reprint ed. 2008)
(commenting on the “breathtaking scope” of Ratzinger’s corpus of

9
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to understand and address opposing positions.19
Additionally, Ratzinger addressed issues bearing on the
foundations of political and social order in a somewhat
systematic way throughout his career. Because his work
represents an impressive integration and synthesis of
theology, philosophy and politics, he has gained respect as
a profound political thinker whose ideas are rich and
coherent.20
Accordingly, this article first frames the issue as
one of properly understanding human freedom and then
presents the basic Christian vision. Next, the article
presents a synthesis of Ratzinger’s writings bearing on
human freedom to help flesh out the deeper philosophical
and theological foundation for the Christian vision; namely,
its grounding in the existence of a personal God and the
perceptions and conceptions arising from deep reflection on
the Trinity and the Incarnation. Such study reveals
intelligibility in creation that must be respected.
Specifically, it reveals that within each human being there
exists an existential capacity designed to reach beyond the
self and toward God and others, a capacity fulfilled by reunion with God and others. Freedom, then, is living one’s
life in a manner that helps one to achieve that union, and
Christian values—which are consistent with the
intelligibility in creation—thereby promote human
freedom. Ratzinger’s work presents a strong argument that
intellectual work, on its originality, creativity, and consistency, and on
Ratzinger’s attention to the ideas of “the great thinkers of humanity,
theologians and otherwise”).
19
Id. at xix (noting that all of Ratzinger’s writings reveal his “courage
to face any question or objection because of the confidence he has in
the Truth revealed in Jesus Christ and handed on by the church’s
apostolic tradition”).
20
See, e.g., THOMAS R. ROURKE, THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
THOUGHT OF BENEDICT XVI 3-4 (2011), 3-4 (explaining that
Benedict’s social thought merits considerably more attention than it has
received).
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foundational judgments concerning the ends in life worthy
of pursuit are not solely subjective. Rather, freedom is an
integral aspect of the human person, and thus, how freedom
is used matters—and matters beyond the personal or
private, subjective sphere.
Furthermore, because survival of democracy hinges
on sufficient unity among the citizens regarding the values
deemed inviolable,21 Ratzinger advocates that the state has
a role in prudently fostering respect for those values,
including expecting reverence and respect for God and holy
things, and encouraging serious study of questions such as
the existence of and nature of God.22 Again, this
21

See JOSEPH RATZINGER, Freedom and Constraint in the Church, in
CHURCH, ECUMENISM & POLITICS: NEW ESSAYS IN ECCLESIOLOGY,
supra note 12, at 183, 188 [hereinafter Ratzinger, Freedom and
Constraint] (“Ultimately, the democratic system can function only if
certain fundamental values . . . are recognized as valid by everyone.”
“[T]here must be an ethos which is jointly accepted and maintained
even if its rational basis cannot be established absolutely and
conclusively.”). See also Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra note
12, at 205 (“Pluralist democracy, in itself, does not “unite[] its citizens
in a fundamental assent to the state. . . .For its foundations, it depends
on other powers and forces outside of itself.”); JOSEPH RATZINGER,
Luther and the Unity of the Churches, in CHURCH, ECUMENISM &
POLITICS: NEW ESSAYS IN ECCLESIOLOGY, supra note 12, at 99, 131
[hereinafter Ratzinger, Luther] (noting that “[a] formal unity without
clear content is fundamentally no unity at all.” Unity based on
common skepticism and not knowledge is, in essence, based on
capitulation).
22
See, e.g., Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra note 12, at 21820. Ratzinger is clear, however, in placing the primary responsibility
for cultivating the spiritual foundation of society on the Church and
Christians. Id. See also JOSEPH RATZINGER, Freedom, Law, and the
Good, in VALUES IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL 52 (2006) (emphasizing the
public task of Christian churches: they must be free to “address the
freedom of all human beings so that the moral forces of history may
remain forces in the present”); JOSEPH RATZINGER, Biblical Aspects of
the Question of Faith and Politics, in CHURCH, ECUMENISM &
POLITICS: NEW ESSAYS IN ECCLESIOLOGY, supra note 12, at 147, 151
(explaining that the core responsible political activity is to nurture

11
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perspective is at odds with the neutrality principle imposed
by the American judiciary, at least since the 1950s.23 Thus,
this article also clarifies how Ratzinger’s vision of human
freedom renders his approach to Church-State issues fully
consistent with vigorous respect for religious freedom or
freedom of conscience. The bottom-line is that personal
choices about how to live matter, and it is permissible for
the state to foster a culture in which persons can more
readily live in a genuinely human way—not through heavyhanded or unnecessary measures, but through prudent
adherence to a limited number of core values.
V. The Overarching Issue: Properly Understanding
Human Freedom
In discussing democracy’s need for grounding itself
in Christian moral insights and values, Ratzinger generally
supports his message with a two-pronged approach. Under
the first prong, he points to and explains why prevalent
political theories of the modern era have failed. Under the
second prong, he presents, in a variety of ways, his vision
for safeguarding genuine human freedom. This article
focuses primarily on the second prong of his argument, but
this section also briefly introduces Ratzinger’s perspective
on the failures of modern political philosophies.
In his writings, Ratzinger has demonstrated that
political theories following the trajectory initiated by
Rousseau-type thinkers are grounded in a radical
philosophy of freedom and what he has labeled as the
“secular trinity of ideas;” the three ideas are progress,
absolutism of scientific technology, and political
public acceptance of the validity of morality and God’s
commandments).
23
In Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), the
Supreme Court adopted the neutrality principle in the context of the
Establishment Clause.
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messianism.24
Ratzinger characterizes the radical
philosophy of freedom as encompassing the individualistic
ideology that was a component of all Enlightenment
thought, the anarchic tendencies flowing from Rousseau’s
vision of human nature and the social contract where no
right order exists and human will is the sole norm of human
action,25 and the Marxist tendency to rely on structures and
24

Ratzinger discusses two good examples of failures of modern
philosophies. See Ratzinger, A Turning Point, supra note 11, at 25-133;
JOSEPH RATZINGER, Freedom and Liberation: The Anthropological
Vision of the 1986 Instruction Libertatis Conscientia, in CHURCH,
ECUMENISM & POLITICS, supra note 12, at 255, 256-265 [hereinafter
Ratzinger, Freedom and Liberation].
25
Rousseau’s essay on the social contract was written in 1762. See
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT OR: PRINCIPLES OF
POLITICAL
RIGHT,
(1762),
available
at
http://www.constitution.org/jjr/socon.htm [hereinafter Rousseau, Social
Contract]. To Rousseau, the “sacred right” of the social order is built
upon conventions, see id., Bk. I, ch. I., conventions that flow from
Rousseau’s view of human nature. See id. at Bk. I, ch. II. To
Rousseau, human beings differ from animals in only two respects: they
can rise above instincts by an act of freedom or free will, and they have
a faculty of self-preservation that develops all other faculties. See
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF INEQUALITY
25 (Donald A. Cress trans., Hackett Pub. Co. 1992) (1755)).
Rousseau’s notion of the social compact reflects these dual
and limited aspects of human nature. In his theory of the social
contract, because humans cannot know what justice is, nothing exists to
delimit the majority vote. See Rousseau, Social Contract, supra, at Bk
II, ch. VI. His concept of the “general will” is, in the end, the only
limit on government, and persons are entitled to reclaim their natural
rights and liberties when law and government fail to reflect the general
will. But Rousseau does not see the general will as being subject to any
absolute measure.
Rousseau’s philosophy stands in stark contrast to that of John
Locke. See JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE
ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1690), available
at http://jim.com/2ndtreat.htm (also known as Locke’s Second Treatise
on Government). The second essay on civil government was drafted
between 1685–1688.
See JOHN LOCKE, TREATISE OF CIVIL
GOVERNMENT AND LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, (Sterling P.
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systems to bring about justice.26 From this perspective,
freedom generally is understood as:
the possibility of doing
everything one wants to do
and of doing only what one
would like to do oneself.
Freedom understood in this
way is a matter of doing what
Lamprecht ed. 1937) [hereinafter Locke, Second Treatise]. Locke’s
theory of the social contract rests solidly on an absolute measure that
operates as a genuine limit on the “one will” that gives rise to political
laws and acts of government. To Locke, the nature of the social
compact is inescapably tied to limits on human action existing in the
state of nature before societies have consented to be governed: the law
of God and the law of nature. To Locke, this law stands as “an eternal
rule to all men, legislators as well as others.” See Locke, Second
Treatise, id. at #135.
Both Locke and Rousseau recognized consent of the people as
the source of authority in civil society, namely, the consent arising
upon agreement to be part of the society. Both also propose that
legitimate laws made within society will be grounded in the consent of
the body politic, as determined by majority vote, and delimited by the
notion of the common good of the community. The key difference
between Locke and Rousseau lies in the operation of and limits upon
that “one will.” Whereas in Rousseau’s theory the legislative power
becomes, in essence, the source of the laws governing society, in
Locke’s theory the legislative power serves a higher law, by making the
law of God and the law of nature better known and fostering a more
effective operation of the law for the general good of all. Further, the
majority vote in Locke’s theory serves only as a means to ensure that
laws reflect the consent of society. The majority vote remains
subordinate to the law of God and the law of nature. A majority vote
inconsistent with the Eternal law would constitute a sign that the
agreement has been breached, thereby legitimizing resort to the natural
liberty to form a new society.
26
JOSEPH RATZINGER, Truth and Freedom, in THE ESSENTIAL POPE
BENEDICT XVI: HIS CENTRAL WRITINGS & SPEECHES 336, 343 (New
York: HarperOne, 2007) (John F. Thornton & Susan B. Varenne eds.,
HarperOne reprint ed. 2008) [hereinafter Ratzinger, Truth and
Freedom].

14
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one likes, of arbitrary whim. .
. . From this point of view
liberation consists in throwing
off
constraints
and
obligations. Every obligation
appears as a shackle that
restricts
freedom;
every
obligation that is thrown off
becomes a step forward on the
road to freedom. It is clear
that from this kind of point of
view the family, the Church,
morality, and God must
appear antitheses to freedom.
God obliges men and women;
morality is a basic form in
which this obligation to him is
expressed. . . . Even the state,
declared to be the ruler of man
over man, becomes an
opponent of freedom.27
Ratzinger has noted that this perspective is grounded in a
definite understanding of human nature, an understanding
expressed most completely in the philosophy of Sarte:
For Sarte man is pure
existence without essence.
There is no certainty about
what he or she is or how he or
she should be. One must
discover anew what it is to be
human from the nothingness
of an empty freedom. The idea
27

Ratzinger, Freedom and Liberation, supra note 24, at 259-60.
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of freedom is here pushed to
its ultimate radical position,
no
longer
merely
emancipation from tradition
and
authority
but
emancipation from his or her
own nature and essence, a
state
of
complete
indeterminacy which is open
to anything.28
To Ratzinger, history has shown that in reality these
perspectives lead to the opposite of freedom and to human
dissatisfaction. The dissolution of traditional links and
obligations, the dependence on large anonymous systems,
and the alienation resulting when societal practices break
down traditional structures such as family and Church
have, in fact, “turned out more and more to be the precondition for total dictatorship and totalitarian enforcement
of conformity.”29
Similar negative results flow from the interplay of
the secular trinity of ideas of progress, absolutism of
scientific technology, and political messianism. Ratzinger
has explained that the union of these ideas was most
consistently developed in Marxism, emerging as a
“political myth of almost irresistible power.” But the union
of these ideas also exists today, albeit in weaker forms, in
Western society.30 These ideas also represent the exclusion
28

Ratzinger, Freedom and Constraint, supra note 21, at 191. The
perspective is also thoroughly theological: “Behind all this there stands
a programme which must ultimately be labeled theological: God is no
longer recognized as a reality standing over against man, but instead
man may himself or herself become what he or she imagines a divinity
would be if it existed. . . .” Ratzinger, Freedom and Liberation, supra
note 24, at 260.
29
Ratzinger, Freedom and Liberation, supra note 24, at 262.
30
See Ratzinger, A Turning Point, supra note 11, at 129-30.
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of God from the shaping of history and human life.31 Ideas
of progress and absolutism of scientific technology are
grounded in a self-limitation of reason: a narrowing down
of reason to the perception of what is quantitative and, thus,
omits the insights common to almost the whole of mankind
before the modern period. In particular, this omits the
conviction that morality is not created by man on the basis
of calculation of expediency. But, rather, man “finds it
already present in the essence of things.”32 Without
substantive values for guidance, “progress” becomes any
new approach and any new technology necessarily is a
good.33 Messianic approaches to governance place reliance
on systems and structures and political and economic
activity, rather than on ethical efforts of citizens. These
ideas reflect materialism and its program.34 As explained
by Ratzinger, this brand of liberation depends on abdication
of ethical principles and behavior and, therefore, abdication
of responsibility and ultimately of conscience.35 And
destruction or loss of conscience is “the precondition for
totalitarian obedience and totalitarian domination.”36 The
ultimate result of adhering to these political theories thus is
not freedom but, rather, a type of slavery.37
31

Id. at 130 (noting that, in essence, this trinity of ideas replaces and
thus excludes the concept of God).
32
See id., 34. See also JOSEPH RATZINGER, CHRISTIANITY AND THE
CRISIS OF CULTURES, 39-45 (2006).
33
See JOSEPH RATZINGER, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CRISIS OF CULTURES
41-42 (2006) (“[T]he guiding principle is that man’s capability
determines what he does. If you know how to do something, then you
are also permitted to do it. . . . But man knows how to do many things,
and this knowledge increases all the time. If this knowledge does not
find its criterion in a moral norm, it becomes a power for destruction. . .
.”).
34
See Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra note 12, at 205-08.
35
Id.
36
Id. See also Ratzinger, Political Stance, supra note 13, at 165.
37
See Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra note 12, at 205-11
(emphasizing also the break down of the rule of law and a loss of the
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Ratzinger’s attention to and analysis of these
shortcomings and failures is crucial.
If political
philosophies divorced from substantive values or divorced
from core Christian values were producing good results, his
message would be moot. But modern societies keep
stumbling. Even in the United States the situation seems
precarious. A prevalent sentiment exists that government,
particularly at the federal level, is not working. In each
branch of government, law and policy is being made on the
basis of power. Even citizens unfamiliar with political
philosophies generally, or the doctrine of neutrality in
particular, likely would agree that a key problem is the
much divided nature of the electorate—a dividedness
arising in large part because of the absence of societal
consensus on core values.38
After highlighting modern governments’ failures to
achieve freedom, the second prong in Ratzinger’s approach
explains that genuine human freedom is safeguarded only
when democratic government and the majority vote are
limited by inviolable moral standards and, more
specifically, standards grounded in core Christian values.
sense of transcendence that causes people to search for ways to escape
society). See also CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH,
INSTRUCTION ON CHRISTIAN FREEDOM (March 22, 1986),
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc
_con_cfaith_doc_19860322_freedom-liberation_en.html, at #10-19
(noting, inter alia, the new forms of oppression arising from
unrestrained use of technology, modern acts of terrorism, and
collectivist approaches that quash human aspirations for the
transcendent).
38
From Ratzinger’s perspective, the increasing dividedness in society
is due in large measure to the overarching clash between those
believing in dependence on God and those seeking emancipation from
God: “The real antagonism typical of today’s world is not that between
diverse religious cultures; rather, it is the antagonism between the
radical emancipation of man from God, from the roots of life, on the
one hand, and the great religious cultures, on the other.” JOSEPH
RATZINGER, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CRISIS OF CULTURES 44 (2006).
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The importance of democratic government and the majority
vote being delimited by inviolable moral standards should
be fairly obvious. As Ratzinger has emphasized, the
history of the twentieth century has readily demonstrated
that the majority can err—and err seriously.39 Those
adhering to the neutrality principle tend to believe that the
gross abuses that have occurred elsewhere will not happen
in the United States.40 Frankly, that belief has no logical
basis. Nonetheless, another valid reason exists for holding
the view that inviolable moral standards must exist to
delimit the majority. The idea of inviolable rights and
standards was a key premise of the founding generation.
The premise was part and parcel of the prevailing
philosophies of the founding era and is spelled out in the
39

The multiple instances of state sanctioned genocide is a prime
example. See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, Freedom, Law, and the Good,
in VALUES IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL 45-52 (2006) (pointing to the
twentieth century totalitarian states).
Ratzinger also has often
explained that failure to identify values to limit and guide the majority
vote leads to radical relativism. See, e.g., id. at 47, 56 (discussing
Richard Rorty’s “utopia of banality” wherein a freedom without
substance dissolves into meaninglessness). See also Ratzinger, Luther,
supra note 21, at 131 (noting that authority based on skepticism
becomes arbitrary). The basic idea is simply that, without inviolable
standards to delimit majority vote, law becomes nothing other than a
mirror of whatever happens to be the predominant views or opinions of
the moment—however egregious those may be.
40
See, e.g., RICHARD RORTY, TRUTH AND PROGRESS: PHILOSOPHICAL
PAPERS (1998); RICHARD RORTY, OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM, AND
TRUTH: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS (1991). Rorty adheres to the view that
a certain “intuition” provides sufficient safeguards against egregious
government acts. Ratzinger compares Rorty’s views to certain
seventeenth century ideas; namely the idea that there was a single,
universal morality which was a true and clear light that could be
perceived by all humans if they would but open their eyes. Ratzinger
explains that reliance on mere intuition is unworkable in contemporary
society because the “evidential character” of moral principles no longer
exists. See JOSEPH RATZINGER, Freedom, Law, and the Good, in
VALUES IN A T IME OF UPHEAVAL 50-51 (2006).
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founding documents of the United States.41 Therefore, the
more challenging position for many is why the inviolable
values should be—or must be—informed by traditional
Christian insights.42
To that question, Ratzinger spells out a rationale
that is more sophisticated than the one typically provided
by advocates for Christian values. The answer gleaned
from the corpus of Ratzinger’s writings is that Christian
values have their origin from the transcendent and, more
specifically, from the Creator of humanity and the world.
Therefore, these values necessarily are consistent with the
meaning or intelligibility in creation and will thereby
promote genuine human freedom. This answer is grounded
in a certain understanding of human freedom: an
understanding of freedom that is readily distinguishable
from the radical philosophy of freedom described at the
outset of this section. Whether to reconsider use of the
41

See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
Ratzinger notes that de Tocqueville recognized that democracy in
America was made possible by the precondition of a basic moral
conviction. See JOSEPH RATZINGER, Freedom, Law, and the Good, in
VALUES IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL 51 (2006). Indeed, basic social
contract doctrine is premised on the idea that the society consenting to
government agrees on basic ideas about rights and liberties: otherwise,
joining together and consenting to be governed and to be bound by
laws of the society makes little sense.
42
For example, although Professor Steven Smith presents persuasive
reasons why the modern concept of liberal neutrality is illusory and
ineffective (indeed, deceptive), and, in-turn, argues for the need for a
set of substantive beliefs and values upon which public decisions can
be based (and also for a return to a proper understanding of toleration).
He suggests that the content of the substantive values does not matter:
“Legislatures and courts must make decisions, and decisions require
choices among beliefs and values. . . . Thus, every regime must have its
orthodoxy. The orthodoxy might not constitute a cohesive ideology or
theology, it might not be read into the official constitution, and it might
vary from year to year or even, to some degree, from locale to locale.
But a set of substantive beliefs and values . . . must exist.” Smith,
supra note 5, at 332 (emphasis added).

20

Spring 2014| Volume 9 | Issue 3
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 378
neutrality principle, then, ultimately rests on the extent to
which this alternative view of freedom is deemed credible.
As explained, a primary goal of this article is to
provide a comprehensive yet comprehensible explanation
of this alternate vision of human freedom through a
synthesis of Ratzinger’s writings.43 Ratzinger’s work
makes clear that this is a well-reasoned alternative view. It
grounds freedom in a vision of humanity; its history and
destiny as understood in light of philosophical and
theological scrutiny; and the development of God’s
revelation to man. It is a vision intimately bound up with
belief in God. But it is no more theologically based than
neutrality itself and the radical philosophies of freedom,
which are bound up with denial of the existence of God.
II. A Christian View of Human Freedom
Ratzinger’s comprehensive vision of human
freedom can be understood only by studying a number of
sources. These sources include two documents issued by
the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith: Instruction
on Certain Aspects of the “Theology of Liberation,” issued
August 6, 1984 (“ICATL”), and Instruction on Christian
Freedom and Liberation, issued March 22, 1986
(“ICFL”).44 It is useful to begin with an analysis of these
43

Although this vision of freedom is absolutely central to
understanding how to live out Christian faith, this author was unable to
identify a good source providing a comprehensive and comprehensible
explanation.
44
Ratzinger served as prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of
Faith from 1981 until he was elected pope in 2005.
The
CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF FAITH, INSTRUCTION ON
CHRISTIAN FREEDOM AND LIBERATION (Mar. 22, 1986),
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc
_con_cfaith_doc_19860322_freedom-liberation_en.html [hereinafter
ICFL] is the more comprehensive of the two documents. But the
CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF FAITH, INSTRUCTION ON
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documents because they present the basic outline of the
alternative vision of freedom—namely, the Christian
understanding of freedom as liberation from sin and
freedom to follow the commandments of God.
In presenting this vision of human freedom, the two
Instructions rely predominantly on the biblical witness to
God’s historical encounters with humanity.45 The ICFL
makes clear its reliance on revelation—and its approach to
interpreting revelation—by noting at the outset that it is
through the “mystery of the Incarnate Word and Redeemer
of the world” that the Church “possesses the truth regarding
the Father and his love for us, and also the truth concerning
man and his freedom.”46 That is, it is only by revelation
interpreted in light of Jesus Christ as the fullness of
revelation that a proper conception of human freedom can
be grasped.
The ICFL points out that the yearning for freedom
central to the modern era has its source in the Christian
heritage, as captured by the witness of Holy Scripture in
both the Old and New Testaments.47 The key liberating
event testified to in the Old Testament is the Exodus: God’s
CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE “THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION” (Aug. 6, 1984),
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc
_con_cfaith_doc_19840806_theology-liberation_en.html [hereinafter
ICATL] makes certain key points more directly and clearly.
45
Again, this is likely due to the Congregation for the Doctrine of
Faith’s (“CDF”) primary concern with addressing liberation theologies,
which tended to reverse the relationship between the Old and New
Testaments. See Ratzinger, Freedom and Liberation, supra note 24, at
265 (noting that, in liberation theology, “baptism is [] understood on
the basis of the exodus,” and “it is the symbol of a political process of
liberation to which” the oppressed are called; and “Jesus is interpreted
by reference back to Moses, while Moses is interpreted in anticipation
by reference to Marx.”). As explained by Ratzinger, the Instructions
take the traditional path of seeking the internal logic of the basic pattern
of biblical testimony to understand God, the world and man. Id. at 266.
46
ICFL, supra note 44, at #3.
47
Id. at #5.
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action in rescuing his People from their bondage in Egypt,
an event preceded by—and later re-enacted through—the
paschal sacrifice and meal.48 The ICFL recognizes the
Exodus as providing a model for freedom and liberation.
The event, however, must be properly understood. The
ICFL thus explains that, in this event, freedom from
economic, political and cultural slavery is attained, but it is
attained part and parcel with God’s action in entering into a
covenant with Israel. Liberty is thus linked to communion
or a relationship with God.49
Further, as part of the covenant, God provides to
Israel its Law, which included both the moral precepts of
the Decalogue and religious and civil norms to govern the
life of the people chosen by God to be his witness among
the nations.50 Because the core of this collection of laws is
love of God above all things and of neighbor as oneself, the
pattern reflected by the Exodus event is freedom to live in a
society “centered upon worship of the Lord and based upon
justice and law inspired by love.”51 The ICFL also explains
48

As clarified by Ratzinger in Freedom and Liberation, the fact of the
exodus was possible “through a religious event, the sacrifice of the
pasch, which is an anticipated core-element of the Torah.” See
Ratzinger, Freedom and Liberation, supra note 24, at 268.
49
ICFL, supra note 44, at #44.
50
Id. at #45.
51
Id. As explained by Ratzinger in Freedom and Liberation, the goal of
exodus includes discovery of a law that “provides justice and thus
builds up the right relationships of men and women between each other
and with the whole of creation.” See Ratzinger, Freedom and
Liberation, supra note 24, at 267. “These relationships . . . depend
however on the covenant, indeed they are the covenant; they cannot be
devised and shaped by men and women alone, they depend on the
fundamental relationship with regulates all other relationships, the
relationship with God.” Id. at 267. Indeed, “the really liberating
element in the exodus is represented by the inauguration of the
covenant between God and man, the covenant which is made actual in
the Torah, that is in regulations of justice that are the shape of
freedom.” Id. at 268.
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that the Psalms and the testimony of the Prophets suggest
that injustice within this society occurs from transgressions
of the law caused by “hardened hearts,” and that those
suffering from injustice (the poor and the needy) learn to
place their trust in the Lord: “the ‘poor of Yahweh’ know
that communion with him is the most precious treasure and
the one in which man finds his true freedom.”52
Thus, as stated perhaps more directly in the
previously issued ICATL, the Old Testament portrays
salvation and healing from injustice as essentially a
religious experience.
For example, whatever form
suffering may take on the part of those who are faithful to
the God of the Covenant (poverty, political oppression,
hostility of enemies, injustice, failure, or death), it is from
God alone that one can expect salvation and healing.53
Further, freedom is linked to covenant with God and bound
up with law and norms addressing relationships with God
and others.
The witness provided by the New Testament
clarifies this pattern of freedom. As expressed in the ICFL:
“The Exodus, the Covenant, the Law, the voices of the
Prophets and the spirituality of the ‘poor of Yahweh’ only
achieve their full significance in Christ.”54 It is by the
power of the Paschal Mystery of Jesus Christ that humanity
has been set free: “Through his perfect obedience on the
Cross and through the glory of his Resurrection, the Lamb
of God has taken away the sin of the world and opened for
us the way to definitive liberation.”55
More specifically, the ICFL explains that the
Paschal Mystery enabled an outpouring of grace. The heart
of Christian freedom therefore lies in the action of grace,
received through faith and the Church’s sacraments. Grace
52

ICFL, supra note 44, at #46-47.
ICATL, supra note 44, at ch. IV, #5.
54
ICFL, supra note 44, at #49.
55
Id. at #51.
53
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frees humanity from sin and places humanity in
communion with God.56 That is, through Christ’s Death
and Resurrection, humanity is offered the opportunity to be
reconciled with God, and the human experience of
reconciliation is possible through the action of the Holy
Spirit.57 The essence of the freedom attributable to grace
and the work of the Holy Spirit is a capacity which sin had
impaired—a capacity inherent within human beings to love
God above all things and to remain in communion with
him—a capacity that is constantly challenged or affected by
the mystery of iniquity still at work in the world.58 As a
consequence, Christian life is one of perseverance: human
existence is a “spiritual struggle to live according to the
Gospel and is waged with the weapons of God.”59
Grace, thus, is the source of true freedom.60 And
freedom itself is an enhancement or magnification of the
capacity to love. It is moving away from sin and being
brought into a closer union with God. It is the breaking
down of barriers separating humanity from God.61 Again,
the ICATL perhaps is more clear and direct: “Freedom is a
new life in love.”62
The Instructions therefore make clear that the Old
and New Testaments are consistent in revealing that true
56

Id. at #52.
Id.
58
Id. at #53.
59
Id. at #53 (citing Eph 6, 11-17).
60
Id. at #54.
61
Cf. id. at #52 (“In Christ, we can conquer sin, and death no longer
separates us from God”); Id. at #53 (“For freedom Christ has set us
free” (Gal 5:1).); Id. at #58 (“[P]ossessing the pledge of the Spirit, the
People of God is led towards the fullness of freedom. The new
Jerusalem which we fervently await is rightly called the city of freedom
in the highest sense.”); Id. at #63 (“Through the word of God and the
Sacraments, man is freed in the first place from the power of sin and
the power of the Evil One which oppress him; and he is brought into a
communion of love with God”).
62
ICATL, supra note 44, at ch. IV, #2.
57
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liberation depends on God’s action in helping humanity to
avoid hardness of heart, to avoid transgression and sin, and
thus to more fully conform with God’s law or command of
love.63 God calls man to freedom,64 and genuine freedom
is freedom from sin and being with God. Communion with
God is made possible through grace, and communion with
God is linked in some way with how one lives. Living in
accordance with the Gospel brings man and society closer
to God. Rejecting God’s gift of grace results in pursing the
inherent human need for the transcendent—the infinite—in
finite things. Worship of created things—rather than
God—disrupts relationships and causes disorders that affect
the sphere of family and society.65 Thus, liberation from
sin is what will alleviate the evils, oppressions, and
suffering in the world.
V. The Deeper Philosophical &
Foundation for Human Freedom

Theological

As noted, the ICFL explains that the Church
possesses the truth concerning man and his freedom
through the Mystery of Jesus Christ. “From him, who is
‘the way, the truth, and the life’ (Jn 14:6), the Church
receives all that she has to offer mankind.”66 The ICATL
similarly emphasizes that authentic human progress and
liberation rests on three “indispensable pillars” of truth: the
63

Notably, in light of revelation in Jesus Christ, the law of the Old
Testament has been transformed: love is now a “response to the gift of
love with which God draws near to us.” Letter from Benedict XVI,
Supreme Pontiff, to the Bishops, Priests, and Deacons; Men and
Women Religious; and all the Lay Faithful on Christian Love, (Dec.
25,
2005)
(on
file
with
author),
available
at
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents
/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20051225_deus-caritas-est_en.html, at #1.
64
ICFL, supra note 44, at #37.
65
Id. at #39.
66
Id. at #3.
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truth about Jesus, the Savior from human sin; the truth
about the Church; and the truth about man and his
dignity.67 The documents explore most deeply the truth
that genuine human liberation is salvific: it is freedom from
sin.
Yet, the overarching theme of the Instructions is
that truth and freedom are inseparably linked, and that
understanding human freedom also hinges on coming to
understand the truth about man. The ICFL states that, by
revealing to man “his condition as a free person called to
enter into communion with God,” the Gospel of Jesus
Christ prompted an awareness of “hitherto unsuspected
depths of human freedom.”68 Similarly, the ICATL notes
that the radical philosophies of freedom which aim to
create a new man through social control and social
structures “leads to the denial of the meaning of the person
and his transcendence” and, at the same time, destroys the
foundation of ethics, namely, the absolute character of the
distinction between good and evil.69 In both instances, the
CDF is emphasizing the importance of properly
understanding the meaning of the human person.
Understanding the truth about man and the human person
clarifies what sin is, which in turn clarifies what constitutes
liberation.
The Instructions, however, do not explore in any
depth the concept of the human person or the truth about
man. The ICFL rejects the modern concept of the subject
of freedom as “an individual who is fully self-sufficient and
whose finality is the satisfaction of his own interests in the
enjoyment of earthly goods.”70 It states that “every
individual is oriented toward other people” and that
genuine freedom exists only where “reciprocal bonds,
67

ICATL, supra note 44, at ch. XI, #5.
ICFL, supra note 44, at #5.
69
ICATL, supra note 44, ch. IV, #15.
70
ICFL, supra note 44, at #13.
68
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governed by truth and justice, link people to one another.”71
It also states that “God did not create man as a ‘solitary
being’ but wished him to be a ‘social being,’” and, thus,
man “can only grow and realize his vocation in relation
with others.”72 Sin, breaking away from God in acts of
total autonomy and self-sufficiency, constitutes a denial of
self.73 The freedom possible with the assistance of grace is
a restored capacity to love God and remain in communion
with him.74 Love of God, Christian love, takes the form of
fraternal love.75 And, as stated in the ICATL, “[t]he
recognition of the true relationship of human beings to God
constitutes the foundation of justice to the extent that it
rules the relationships between people.”76
But what is the basis for these propositions? In
what way does the truth about man and his destiny or about
the true relationship of human beings to God undermine
ideas of autonomy and self-sufficiency or, on the contrary,
support the idea that human aspirations for freedom hinge
on relationships between people? Again, it is by careful
reflection on Jesus Christ as the fullness of revelation that
truth emerges. In other writings, Cardinal Ratzinger has
tried to flesh out the truth about man emerging from
philosophical and theological reflection on Jesus Christ.
71

Id. at #26.
Id. at #32.
73
Id. at ##37-38. See also ICATL, supra note 44, at ch. IV, #12 (stating
that sin “strikes man in the heart of his personality”). Sin, breaking
away from God, disturbs man’s internal order and balance and the
order and balance in society. Sin also disrupts man’s aspiration to the
infinite, and distorted attachment to finite created things leaves him
“always searching for an impossible peace.” ICFL, supra note 44, at
#40.
74
ICFL, supra note 44, at #53.
75
Id. at ##56-57. Fraternal love encompasses the “direct and
imperative requirement of respect for all human beings in their rights to
life and to dignity.” Id.
76
ICATL, supra note 44, at ch. XI, #6. See also ICFL, supra note 44, at
#60.
72
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The short answer is that the Christian perspective of human
freedom is fully supported when it is understood that man
is made in God’s image precisely insofar as being “from,”
“with,” and “for” constitutes the fundamental
anthropological pattern. It is this pattern that constitutes
the essence of the human person. Moreover, human
freedom is a collective endeavor and attaining freedom
depends on following the way opened up by Jesus Christ.
The cornerstone supporting these basic principles is the
idea of a personal God.
A. Freedom Grounded in a Logos that is Love
A comprehensive vision of Christian freedom is
more understandable and compelling when viewed within
the bigger picture of the existence of “being” in the world.
Explaining how Christianity in general fits into the larger
philosophical realm was part of Ratzinger’s objective in his
book Introduction to Christianity. In this book, Ratzinger
was not addressing freedom specifically, but, nonetheless,
made many points in the book that are relevant to
understanding the Christian vision of human freedom.
Ratzinger explains that, when considering the existence of
being in the world, the overarching question is: “In all the
variety of individual things, what is, so to speak, the
common stuff of being – what is the one being behind the
many ‘things’, which nevertheless all ‘exist.’”77 He notes
that the endless variety of philosophies attempting to think
out “being” can, broadly speaking, be reduced to two basic
possibilities: the materialist solution or the idealistic
solution. He then explains Christianity’s tie to the idealistic
solution.

77

JOSEPH RATZINGER, INTRODUCTION TO CHRISTIANITY 156 (J.R.
Foster trans., Ignatius Press 2d ed. 2004) (1968) [hereinafter Ratzinger,
Introduction].
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The materialistic solution sees everything
encountered in the world as mere matter. Matter is the only
thing that “always remains as demonstrable reality and,
consequently, represents the real being of all that exists.”78
Matter is the raw tangible stuff that constitutes or
comprises things and beings in the world. From a
philosophical perspective, matter is a being that does not
comprehend being in that it “‘is’ but does not understand
itself.”79 Thus, if matter is the being of all that exists, the
logical implication is that any capacity to “understand
being” that may exist in the cosmos arises only as a
secondary, chance product during the course of
development.80 Therefore, the fact that human beings can
understand things, or find meaning in things, is a mere
accident. Materialism, then, accords primacy to the
irrational.81
Christianity rejects the materialist solution in favor
of a modified idealistic solution.82 The idealistic solution
78

Id. at 156.
Id.
80
Id.
81
Ratzinger had highlighted this important point in a number of
writings. See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CRISIS
OF CULTURES 49 (2006) (noting that whether the world comes from an
irrational source is a fundamental issue: “A reason that has its origin in
the irrational and is itself ultimately irrational does not offer a solution
to our problems. Only that creative reason which has manifested itself
as love in the crucified God can truly show us what life is.”).
82
Ratzinger has explained that all great cultures have recognized the
idealistic solution, namely, the doctrine of objective values expressed in
the Being of the world, and the conviction that man’s Being contains an
imperative; he does not invent morality on the basis of expediency but
rather finds it already present in the essence of things. He notes that
this common insight presents itself as the primal evidential character of
human life, and that modern thinkers drew the “simple conclusion” that
moralities of mankind constitute but human constructions. To
Ratzinger, “this diagnosis is extremely superficial. . . .” See JOSEPH
RATZINGER, Faith’s Answer to the Crisis of Values, IN A TURNING
POINT FOR EUROPE: THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD:
79
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posits that the scrutiny of things in the cosmos shows that
things and beings are “being-thought.” That is, all being is
a product of thought. Thinking is prior to matter, and,
specifically, thinking by a subjective mind.83 In nonChristian versions of idealism, all being is the beingthought of one single consciousness, and all being is
unified in the identity of the one consciousness. Any
appearance of independence proves to be mere
appearance.84 The Christian understanding is different
because the thinking being whose thought produces is not
just thought or Eternal Reason but, rather, the being is also
Love.
The person of Jesus brought this point to light in a
powerful way. But there was an understanding that existed
before Christ as a result of God’s encounters with Israel
that revealed him as a personal God. As Ratzinger
explains, the shema of Israel—“Hear, O Israel. He is our
God. He is One.”—is the real core of the believer’s

ASSESSMENT AND FORECAST, supra note 11, at 35-36. Ratzinger has
also explained that belief in Creation is reasonable, and, further, that
“even from the perspective of the data of the natural sciences it is the
‘better hypothesis,’ offering a fuller and better explanation than any of
the other theories.” See Joseph Ratzinger, God the Creator, in IN THE
BEGINNING. . .: A CATHOLIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE STORY OF THE
CREATION AND THE FALL 17 (Boniface Ramsey trans., Wm. B.
Eerdmans Pub. Co. 1995) (1986) [hereinafter Ratzinger, God the
Creator]. In the second homily Ratzinger explains that the scientificbased theories hinge on the entire ensemble of nature arising out of
errors and dissonances and that some scientists acknowledge the
absurdness of the theories, but, nonetheless, cannot break out of the
scientific mindset because “the scientific method demands that a
question not be permitted to which the answer would have to be God.”
JOSEPH RATZINGER, The Meaning of the Biblical Creation Accounts, in
IN THE BEGINNING. . .: A CATHOLIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE STORY OF
THE CREATION AND THE FALL, supra, at 22-25 [hereinafter Ratzinger,
The Meaning].
83
Ratzinger, Introduction, supra note 77, at 156-57.
84
Id. at 157.
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identity and is grounded in the fact that God loves and
wants a relationship with his creation.
The believing Jew dies
reciting this profession; the
Jewish martyrs breathed their
last declaring it and gave their
lives for it. . . . The fact that
this God now shows us his
face in Jesus Christ (Jn 14:9) –
a face that Moses was not
allowed to see (Ex 33:20) –
does not alter this profession
in the least and changes
nothing essential in this
identity. Of course, the fact
that God is personal is not
mentioned in the Bible using
that term, but it is apparent
nevertheless, inasmuch as
there is a name of God. A
name implies the ability to be
called on, to speak, to hear, to
answer. This is essential for
the biblical God, and if this is
taken away, the faith of the
Bible has been abandoned. . . .
But what is actually meant,
then, by God’s name, by his
being personal?
Precisely
this: Not only can we
experience him, beyond all
[earthly] experience, but also
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he
can
express
communicate himself.85

and

God has revealed to humanity that he wants to
communicate with humans. He has communicated himself
to humanity in history because he desires a relationship
with humanity. And he has welcomed prayer from
humans.86 God’s desire and the nature of the relationship is
revealed most fully through Jesus Christ, but Scripture
reveals that God has been in relationship with humanity
since the dawn of creation. The first step in understanding
human freedom as communal with God—involving a
reality internal to the human being, or a capacity to be in
union with God, involves considering the issue from the
the
perspective
of
Christian
idealism—namely,
understanding of God as Reason and Love.
Ratzinger has stressed in many forums the
importance of the decision by the early Christians to
explicitly recognize that the God of the philosophers—the
Logos, the divine presence that can be perceived by the
rational analysis of reality—is one and the same as the
85

Id. at 22-23 (preface to the 2000 edition).
In Spe Salvi, Pope Benedict XVI explains that outside Christianity, a
God to whom one could pray did not exist, and that the idea of a
personal God radically changed the prevailing world-view that, in a
different way, is prominent today. “It is not the elemental spirits of the
universe, the laws of matter, which ultimately govern the world and
mankind, but a personal God governs the stars, that is, the universe; it
is not the laws of matter and of evolution that have the final say, but
reason, will, love – a Person. And if we know this Person and he
knows us, then truly the inexorable power of material elements no
longer has the last word; we are not slaves of the universe and its laws,
we are free.” Letter from Benedict XVI, Supreme Pontiff, to Bishops,
Priests, and Deacons; Men and Women Religious; and all the Lay
Faithful on Christian Love (Nov., 30 2007) (on file with author),
available
at
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents
/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20071130_spe-salvi_en.html, at #5.
86
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personal God who has entered history.87 To Christians, the
Logos is not just Eternal Reason. It is not an anonymous,
neutral consciousness. The Christian God is not simply a
“first cause.” Rather, in Christianity the Logos loves. The
Logos is Love.88
A Logos that is Love fundamentally alters idealism.
The consciousness that is the ultimate being is not a mere
craftsman, but rather, is creative mind.89 Indeed, Eternal
Reason is creative because it is Love. Freedom is also a
consequence of Love. In creating or thinking, the Logos
that is Love gives freedom to its creation. As explained by
Ratzinger, the creative consciousness that is Love releases
what has been thought into the freedom of its own,
independent existence. Being-thought of the Logos that is
Love has more than a mere appearance of being: beingthought is true being itself.90
In Introduction to Christianity, Ratzinger
highlighted several key implications flowing from this
understanding of Logos as creating and loving that are
relevant to understanding freedom. First, each human
being is not merely an individual “reproduction” or
secondary thing—the result of idea being diffused into
matter. Rather, each human being is a definite being, a true
being, unique and unrepeatable. “The highest is not the
87

Ratzinger, Introduction, supra note 77, at 138.
Ratzinger gives an extensive treatment to the concept that God is
Love. See Letter from Benedict XVI, Supreme Pontiff, to the Bishops,
Priests, and Deacons; Men and Women Religious; and all the Lay
Faithful on Christian Love, (Dec. 25, 2005) (on file with author),
available
at
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents
/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20051225_deus-caritas-est_en.html, at #1..
89
Ratzinger, Introduction, supra note 77, at 157. Ratzinger has noted
that the revelation that existence is Creation was itself a decisive
moment of Enlightenment. See Ratzinger, God the Creator, supra note
82, at 14.
90
Ratzinger, Introduction, supra note 77, at 157.
88
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most universal but, precisely, the particular, and the
Christian faith is thus above all also the option for man as
the irreducible, infinity-oriented being.”91 Each human
being exists because of being thought by God and, thus, is
known by and loved by God.
Second, the existence of any being created by the
Logos that is Love is, essentially, freedom. Therefore,
freedom is the structural form of all being.92 Stated another
way, it can be said that life itself is freedom. This has
positive and negative aspects. Because freedom is the
structure of creation, incomprehensibility is part and parcel
of the cosmos.
The world cannot be reduced to
mathematics, and the mystery of the demonic exists: “As
the arena of love [the world] is also the playground of
freedom and also incurs the risk of evil.” But the mystery
of darkness can be seen as an acceptable tradeoff for the
greater positives of freedom and love.93 Each human being
is a distinct being set free by God because of God’s love.
Third, all being is intelligible and meaningful
because pure intellect made it and He made it by thinking
it. The intelligibility in things, in being-thought that is true
being, is the expression of creative pre-mediation. Human
thinking, then, is “re-thinking,” and it is right or true when
it is in conformity with the thought of the Creator.94 As
explained by Ratzinger: “Man can rethink the logos, the
meaning of being, because his own logos, his own reason,
is logos of the one logos, thought of the original thought, of
the creative spirit that permeates and governs his being.”95
This means that the conception of man and the way man
91

Id. at 158. The Supreme Being can care for humans precisely
because His consciousness does not have limits – He can embrace the
whole. Id. at 146. From this perspective, love is higher than thought.
Id. at 147.
92
Id. at 157.
93
Id. at 159-60.
94
Id. at 59.
95
Id.
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should live is correct and true when in conformity with
God’s idea of man. Knowing what it means to be human
means coming to know the “Idea” of the Creative being.
If Eternal Reason and Creative Love are one and the
same, the measure of human action is Truth. This was the
message of Jesus: "The truth will make you free" (Jn 8:32).
But humanity can only know the Truth with God’s help and
Truth that comes from God has its center in Jesus Christ.96
This is the real essence of Christian faith. Faith is the
encounter with Jesus. Faith is the Word coming from the
transcendent. Faith is reception of what cannot be thought
out.97 In God’s encounters with mankind throughout
history, God is seeking a relationship that hinges on
mankind understanding God’s Idea for humanity. Creation
and Covenant go hand in hand.98 Jesus Christ is the key to
understanding God’s Idea for humanity. Jesus Christ is
essential to human freedom because he brought knowledge
and understanding—the fullness of revelation—to assist
human reasoning. But this is not all. It is his presence and

96

ICFL, supra note 44, at #3.
See JOSEPH RATZINGER, The Ecclesiology of the Second Vatican
Council, in CHURCH, ECUMENISM & POLITICS: NEW ESSAYS IN
ECCLESIOLOGY, supra note 12, at 3, 10 (“Faith is the encounter with
what I cannot think up myself or bring about by my own efforts but
what must come to encounter me”); Ratzinger, Luther, supra note 21,
at 126-27 (Christian faith is sharing in knowledge with Jesus Christ).
98
To Ratzinger, this point is crucial. Materialism, as it shows up in its
many philosophical forms, rejects creation because it implies a
dependence that deprives the world its power and that ultimately is
perceived as the real barrier to freedom; it will not entrust itself to a
world already created, but only to world still to be created. The
Christian option is the opposite. Human beings are dependent. But it
is a dependence that takes the form of love and, thus, does not involve
diminishment of self, but, rather, leads to freedom. See JOSEPH
RATZINGER, The Consequences of Faith in Creation, in “In the
Beginning. . .: A CATHOLIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE STORY OF
CREATION AND THE FALL, supra note 82, at 98-100.
97
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the presence of the Holy Spirit that enable human union
with God.
B. Trinitarian Insights into Freedom
The Christian vision of freedom as explained by
Ratzinger partially rests on the principle that “man is God’s
image precisely insofar as being ‘from,’ ‘with,’ and ‘for’
constitute the fundamental anthropological pattern.”99 It is
this pattern that constitutes the essence of the human
person. Ratzinger’s understanding of this pattern rests on
the concept of the human person as revealed by Jesus
Christ and, more specifically, by knowledge of God as “one
being in three persons” and knowledge of Jesus Christ as
having “two natures and one person.” Therefore, it is a
concept with meaning because of the Christian doctrine of
the Trinity.
1) The Concept of Person
The concept of person that emerged from the
development of the doctrine of the Trinity, and the process
of developing the concept, were explored by Ratzinger in
Retrieving the Tradition: Concerning the Notion of Person
in Theology, published in 1990.100 In this article, Ratzinger
points out that early Christian philosophers latched onto a
philosophically insignificant concept—the literary use of
dialogue or roles, persona, to depict the action occurring in
dramatic events—and transformed the concept in a radical
way. “The ‘role’ truly exists; it is . . . the face, the person

99

Ratzinger highlighted this point. See Ratzinger, Truth and Freedom,
supra note 26, at 346-47.
100
Joseph Ratzinger, Retrieving the Tradition: Concerning the Notion
of Person in Theology, 17 COMMUNIO 439 (1990) [hereinafter
Ratzinger, Retrieving the Tradition].
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of the Logos.”101 Jesus’s words and actions support the
concept of the Trinity, but what helps make the concept of
the Trinity comprehensible?
The early Christian
philosophers used the transformed concept of persona to
help explain the reality of the intra-divine dialogue found
throughout Scripture and the ontological reality of being
emphasized by St. John in writing his Gospel.
Foremost, the concept of “person” was understood
as a dialogical reality whose essence is action. But what is
the nature of this reality?102 To the early Christian
philosophers, the nature of reality fell into one of two
categories: substance (the sustaining form or real essence of
a thing) or matter with its accidents (the chance
circumstances of being). God is wholly spirit with no
accidents. The crux of the question, then, was whether the
persons of God were substance. The philosophers knew
this could not be the case since the essence of God’s being
101

Id. at 439, 442. In interpreting poems or narratives, ancient literary
scholars would uncover the prosopon or persona used by the author. In
studying Scripture, Christian philosophers noticed a similar use of
dialogue in that God speaks to himself and God speaks through the
Prophets. The philosophers spoke in terms of the “sacred writers”
introducing “different prosopa, different roles,” but the Christian
philosophers recognized a radical difference: “The roles introduced by
the sacred writer are realities, they are dialogical realities.” Id. at 441.
102
The question whether the three persons were in fact realities was,
itself, a challenging philosophical and theological question. Therefore,
does the “triplicity” genuinely inform humanity about what God is like
in himself or only about how man can relate to God or the mode in
which God relates to man? The Church settled on the understanding
that “God is as he shows himself; God does not show himself in a way
in which he is not.” Ratzinger, Introduction, supra note 77, at 165
(emphasis in original). Or, as explained by Ratzinger, “[a]lthough it is
true that we only know God as he is reflected in human thought, the
Christian faith held firmly to the view that in this reflection it is him
that we know. Even if we are not capable of breaking out of the narrow
bounds of our consciousness, God can nevertheless break into this
consciousness and show himself in it.” Id. at 167 (emphasis in
original).
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is oneness. Scripture also made clear the idea of “relation”
between the persons of God: the Father and the Son.
Philosophy traditionally considered “relation” an aspect of
accidents, or a characteristic of matter (a thing is between,
beside, above, etc.), as opposed to form. The logical
solution was thus to conceive of relation differently: as a
reality within being and distinct from substance and
accident. Person is relation. Relation is the person, and the
person exists only as relation. Father, Son, and the Holy
Spirit are real existing relations, and nothing besides.103
Further, they are pure act. The idea that the Father begets
the Son means that the Father is self-donation: pure reality
of act, pure act-being.104 In Ratzinger’s words, “[i]n God,
person is the pure relativity of being turned toward the
other; . . . [it lies] on the level of dialogical reality, of
relativity toward other.”105
Ratzinger recognizes the interplay between
philosophy and theology that led to this original concept of
person as pure relativity toward others. But he also
emphasizes that Scripture confirms and deepens this
understanding. He explains that statements such as “The
Son cannot do anything of himself” (John 5:19) or “I and
the Father are one” (John 10:30) mean that Jesus “has
nothing of himself alone,” that he “does not place himself
as a delimited substance next to the Father;” and that Jesus
“constitutes nothing but relativity toward [the Father] that
103

Ratzinger, Retrieving the Tradition, supra note 100 at 444.
Id. at 444.
105
Id. Ratzinger emphasizes the novelty and value of this Christian
contribution to human thought: “Again we encounter the Christian
newness of the personalistic idea in all its sharpness and clarity. The
contribution offered by faith to human thought becomes especially
clear and palpable here. It was faith that gave birth to this idea of pure
act, of pure relativity, which does not lie on the level of substance and
does not touch or divide substance; and it was faith that thereby
brought the personal phenomenon into view.” Id. at 445 (emphasis in
original).
104

39

Spring 2014| Volume 9 | Issue 3
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 397
does not delimit a precinct of what is merely and properly
its own.”106 Ratzinger also sees other Scriptural themes as
reinforcing the idea of person or relation as encompassing
“openness,” specifically, the theology of mission and the
doctrine of the Logos. In both the Old and New
Testaments, the emissary is one with the sender. Christ is
the genuine emissary who is in his entire nature “the one
sent.” As “the one sent” Jesus stands in complete relativity
of existence towards the one who sent him. Thus, the
“content of Jesus’ existence is ‘being from someone and
toward someone,’ the absolute openness of existence
without any reservation of what is merely and properly
one’s own.”107 The doctrine of the Logos is consistent.
The term Logos has rich significance in terms of eternal
rationality. But, in addition, Ratzinger points out that the
Logos, as Word, “is essentially from someone else and
toward someone else; word is existence that is completely
path and openness.”108
Moreover, Ratzinger points out that Scripture itself
suggests that this idea of person should be transferred to
humans. Jesus tells his disciples that “Without me you can
do nothing” (John 15:5), and prays that “they may be one
as we are one” (John 17:11).109 The idea of emissary,
similarly, is transferred to the disciples when Jesus states,
“As the Father has sent me, so I am sending you” (John
20:21). Ratzinger thus notes:

106

Id. at 445.
Id. at 446.
108
Id.
109
Ratzinger thus notes: “It is thus part of the existence even of the
disciples that man does not posit the reservation of what is merely and
properly his own, does not strive to form the substance of the closed
self, but enters into pure relativity toward the other and toward God. It
is in this way that he truly come to himself and into the fullness of his
own, because he enters into unity with the one to whom he is related.”
Id. at 445.
107
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I
believe
a
profound
illumination of God as well as
man occurs here, the decisive
illumination of what person
must mean in terms of
Scripture: not a substance that
closes itself in itself, but the
phenomenon of complete
relativity, which is, of course,
realized in its entirety only in
the one who is God, but which
indicates the direction of all
personal being.”110
Theological and philosophical reflection on the knowledge
of God as the Trinity, as three persons in one being, thus
provides a solid foundation for the idea that “relativity,
being turned toward other” is a distinct aspect of the human
person and thus of human existence.
In Retrieving the Tradition, Ratzinger also discusses
how reflection on knowledge of Christ reinforces this
vision of the human person. In trying to grasp the meaning
of Christ, theologians again focused on the word persona.
The formula is as follows: Christ has two natures—a
divine and human nature—but only one divine person.
Ratzinger notes that, as to the meaning of “person”
reflected in this formula, the early theologians worked out
what the person is not, but did not clarify with the same
precision what the concept means positively. In the many
battles over the question of “who and what is this Christ,” it
was clarified that the formula and its use of the phrase
“divine person” does not in any way indicate that anything
was lacking in the humanity of Christ.111 Therefore, the
phrase “divine person” cannot be thought of as indicating
110
111

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 448.
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that the reality of person, the reality of relativity, does not
reach Jesus’s humanity. Rather, the concept of person is an
essential aspect of the entire existence of Jesus, his divinity
and humanity. Beyond this, however, Ratzinger only
identifies “hints that point out the direction” for
Christological and, in turn, anthropological reflection. Yet
these hints are powerful and well grounded.
Ratzinger points out that Boethius’s concept of
person, which prevailed in Western philosophy as “the
individual substance of a rational nature,” is erroneous and
unhelpful in the context of the Trinity and Christology
because it puts the idea of “person” on the level of
substance.112 Reflection on God as three persons has
placed “person” in an arena of being distinct from both
substance and accident or matter. Further, person is an
aspect of the spirit, and in Jesus, would be an aspect of his
divinity and humanity.
In humanity, this spirit is
embodied.
Ratzinger then engages in philosophical reflection
on the nature of spirit to make a key point about the human
person. First, in contrast to matter that “is what is,” the
spirit is that “which is not only there, but is itself in
transcending itself, in looking toward the other and in
Because openness—
looking back upon itself.”113
relatedness to the whole—is thus the essence of spirit, it is
in reaching beyond itself, by being with other, that spirit
comes to itself. Second, spirit is that being which is able to
think about itself, about being in general, and about the
wholly other, namely, the transcendent God. Indeed,
Ratzinger points out that the ability to reflect on the
concept of God is the mark that truly distinguishes the
112

Id. at 448. (In other contexts, Boethius’s concept can provide a
springboard for reflection about the concept of person. See, e.g., John
Paul II’s work on the acting-person.)
113
Id. at 451 (quoting HEDWIG CONRAD-MARTIUS, DAS SEIN 133 (
1957)).
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human spirit from other forms of consciousness found in
animals.114 Third, the other through which the spirit
ultimately comes to itself must be God. He concludes that
if the person is itself the more it is with the other, “then the
person is all the more itself the more it is with the wholly
other, with God.”115 Or, stated another way: the “human
person is the event or being of relativity” and the “more the
person’s relativity aims totally and directly at its final goal,
at transcendence, the more the person is itself.”116
Integrating this point with knowledge of Christ,
Ratzinger sees two main ideas emerge. In Christ, “being
with other” is radically realized. Relativity toward other is
always the foundation of his consciousness and existence.
But this does not cancel out the “being with” that is
inherent to his human nature. “In Christ, in the man who is
completely with God, human existence is not canceled, but
comes to its highest possibility, which consists in
transcending itself into the absolute and in the integration
of its own relativity into the absoluteness of divine love.”117
Ratzinger’s first point is that this implies that the human
person in history is “being on the way” towards integration
into divine love.118
His second point flows from the fact that knowledge
of Christ “adds the idea of ‘we’ to the idea of ‘I’ and
‘you.’” Ratzinger notes that Scripture depicts Christ as the
“all-encompassing space in which the ‘we’ of human
beings gathers on the way to the Father.”119 Therefore,
Christ, the one divine person, is the “we” into which Love,
the Holy Spirit, gathers humanity. Similarly, Scripture
114

Id. at 451.
Id. at 451-52.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id. Ratzinger does not emphasize the point in this article, but this
fact is also the reason why, or the mechanism through which, the
persons of collective humanity are able to integrate with God.
119
Id. at 452-53.
115
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shows God as the “we” of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.
Thus, the dialogical principle in Christianity is not simply
an “I-Thou” relationship. Rather, on both sides of the
dialogue, the “I” is integrated into the greater “we.”120
Thus, the true character of dialogue with the Father—
integration of the human relativity with Divine Love—is
properly reflected in the liturgical formula “through Christ
in the Holy Spirit to the Father.”121 To Ratzinger, this
proper understanding of the human person’s relationship
with God totally undermines a Christian view that
emphasizes only an individualized relationship with
God.122 Individuals should strive for a deep and personally
heartfelt relationship with God, but each person’s
relationship with God is necessarily intertwined with and
part of God’s relationship with humanity as a whole.
2) Freedom as Transcendence towards
Other
Understanding the concept of the human person,
and integrating it with the cornerstone idea of a personal
God, clarifies the following: The human being is a unity, a
spirit-in-body. An essential aspect of this unity is an
existential component: a reality encompassed by the term
person, a component that is pure relativity that knows of
God and is striving for integration with or union with God.
120

Id. at 453.
Id.
122
He also notes that the typical individualized “I”–“You” perspective
contributed to the eventual loss of the “You.” Id. at 453 (noting that in
Kant’s transcendental philosophy the “you” is no longer found). At the
same time, Ratzinger acknowledges that this collective vision of
integration or union with God was obscured by the manner in which
both Augustine and Thomas Aquinas presented certain aspects of the
Trinity. Id. at 454. See also id. at 449. But, the existential approach had
been introduced by the beginning of the Middle Ages by Richard of St.
Victor. See id. at 449.
121
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This existential component is integral to each human being
by virtue of being a creature of a personal God, a Logos
that is Love, and a God whose essence of oneness includes
a dialogical reality that is pure relativity of being turned
toward other. Indeed, for a Logos that is Love—a personal
God—this reality that is pure relativity necessarily exists.
It is the essence of Love. And it is this Love that is an
integral part of each human being and an inherent aspect of
human nature.123 It is this Love that is the person and the
relativity of each human. The love or relativity within each
human being is completed only by re-union with God.
Union or integration occurs on the level or plane of
relation, or Love, and union with God depends on thinking
and acting with God. Union or integration of this love in
each human being with Divine Love is possible in and
through Jesus Christ and, thus, occurs collectively with
other human beings.
These insights into the essence of the concept of
person clarify the nature of sin and thus why genuine
liberation is freedom from sin. Man does not come to
himself through autonomy and self-sufficiency. Rather, the
human person strives towards transcendence. “It is in this
way that he truly comes to himself and into the fullness of
his own, because he enters into unity with the one to whom
he is related.”124 This involves turning toward others. The
fundamental figure of human existence thus is a being
“from,” “with,” and “for,” and sin thus consists in human
123

The magisterium uses the phrase “nature of a being” to refer to what
constitutes the being as such, with the dynamism of its tendencies
toward its proper ends; “It is from God that natures possess what they
are, as well as their proper ends.” Beings are created and “impregnated
with a significance in which man, as the image of God, is capable of
discerning the creating hand of God.” INTERNATIONAL THEOLOGICAL
COMMISSION, FAITH AND INCULTURATION ch. I, #1 (1988), available
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/cti_documents
/rc_cti_1988_fede-inculturazione_en.html (internal quotations omitted)
124
Ratzinger, Retrieving the Tradition, supra note 100, at 445.
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actions that interfere with this pattern and with union with
God. Further, because the person is more himself or herself
the more the person’s relativity aims totally and directly at
its final goal and at transcendence, freedom necessarily
consists in liberation from sin.
C. The Incarnation: Freedom as Fulfillment of
the Divine Idea
The revelation brought by Jesus Christ opened a
whole new dimension to humanity’s knowledge of God
and, in turn, humanity’s knowledge of man. While this
article has discussed much of that insight bearing on human
freedom, Ratzinger’s writing fleshes out an even deeper
dimension of human freedom. A dimension grounded in
the unity of humanity and relating to how Jesus Christ
enables human union with God. This perspective of human
freedom only comes to light with the fullness of the
message of Christ. A fullness that is still unfolding but that
was rendered substantially comprehensible in the first
several centuries of Christianity by Christian philosophers
working with the Church and from within the faith.
In working out the implications of the doctrine of
the Trinity, along with the implications of understanding
the Logos as Love, the meaning of liberation from sin
began to come to light. Jesus brought liberation from sin.
It is in Christ that humanity has been set free. Freedom is
thinking and acting with God, such that union with God
occurs on the level or plane of relation, or Love. But, the
question arises: How, more specifically, does Jesus enable
humanity to achieve God’s objective? Ratzinger has
addressed this more particular aspect of the Mystery of the
Incarnation and the Trinity.
As explained, the doctrine of the Trinity posits God
as three Persons in One Being. Each Person is a reality or
an act of relativity. God is Father only in relation to his
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Son, only in “being for” the other. He is the act of giving
himself. Similarly, Christ is Son only in relation to Father.
He has nothing of his own and can do nothing on his own.
He stands in the Father and constantly is one with him.
Son is “being from” another. But since he also is one with
the Father, he is a “being for.” The Son is being “for
others.” This is the essence of the revelation of Jesus’s life
and work: the whole being of Jesus is a function of the “for
us.”125 Jesus is thus absolute openness of existence, from
and for. This existence is a complete path and openness.
The Holy Spirit is God facing outward, the means through
which Jesus Christ—in all his openness and breadth and
freedom—remains present in the history of the world.126
The Holy Spirit is the gift of Love and the constituting
principle of the new man in Christ.127
Ratzinger notes in Introduction to Christianity that,
in addition to other radical insights, the triple relativity of
these Persons in the one Being of God brought about a
profound break-through relating to unity and plurality in
125

Ratzinger, Introduction, supra note 77, at 204. Indeed, Christians
understand that it is only “to him who died on the Cross, to him who
renounced all earthly power . . . to him who laid aside the sword and . .
. went to his death for others, to him who saw the meaning of human
existence, not in power and self-assertion, but in existing utterly for
others – who indeed was, as the Cross shows, existence for others – to
him and him alone God has said “You are my son, today I have
begotten you.” Id. at 219. Love of God and neighbor, which devolves
to service to others is, of course, the crux of the Jesus’s teaching. But,
what is important is not that Jesus left behind a body of teaching. What
is important is that Jesus is his teaching. Id. at 205, 226. As explained
by Ratzinger, “his being itself is service” and for this reason “it is
sonship.” Id. at 226.
126
Id. at 332-34.
127
Id. at 337. The Holy Spirit is “God’s gift to history in the
community of those who believe in Christ,” id. at 331, a gift accessible
largely through baptism, penance, and the Eucharist. Id. at 336. The
center of the Spirit’s activity in the world is thus the Church. Id. at
335.
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the philosophy of being. To ancient thought, only unity or
oneness could be divine, and plurality was conceived as a
disintegration of divine.128 However, if the highest Being
no longer is understood as a detached Being, existing
closed in on himself in his oneness, divinity is not mere
unity. Plurality too has its inner ground in God. “Plurality
is not just disintegration that sets in outside the divinity. . . .
it is not the result of the dualism of two opposing powers; it
corresponds to the creative fullness of God, who himself
stands above plurality and unity, encompassing both.”129
Ratzinger explains that the “multi-unity that grows in love
is a more radical, truer unity than the unity of the
‘atom.’”130 Thus, the “three persons” who exist in God do
not impair the unity or oneness of God but, rather, fills-out
that oneness.131
The idea that plurality can enhance unity makes
comprehensible the idea of collective freedom in and
through Jesus. Notably, Ratzinger explains in Introduction
to Christianity that this fuller message of Christian
liberation from sin has been obscured in recent centuries
due to an emphasis on “theologies of the cross” and St.
Anselm’s “satisfaction theory.”132 While these theories
have elements of truth, Ratzinger argues that a truer picture
exists. This picture rests more heavily on a theology of the
Incarnation and the Logos as Love. As explained, the
Logos that is Love creates being that can understand itself
and desires. That being does understand itself and that it
thereby comes to itself. The Incarnation is essential to this
objective. For humanity, the Incarnation was a crucial step
in the process of coming to know itself. Further, for the
128

Id. at 178.
Id. at 179.
130
Id.
131
“[P]ure oneness can only occur in the spirit and embraces the
relatedness of love.” Id. at 188.
132
Id. at 231-32.
129
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Logos that is Love, the Incarnation simply is part and
parcel of the divine Idea “man.”
The doctrine of the Incarnation focuses on the fact
of God’s assuming human nature: the fact that the Word
became flesh. Although this paper has not yet focused on
it, one other important aspect of the philosophical and
theological debates concerning the doctrine of the Trinity is
the key question whether Jesus was both fully divine and
fully human. In fact, the issue is the most fundamental one
because if Jesus was not fully divine and fully human, there
would be no need to delve into the issue of what it means
that there exist “three Persons in one Being.” Despite the
many theories proffered with other answers, however,
Christian philosophers working with the Church and from
within the faith adhered to the central conviction that
Jesus’s two natures, human and divine, were both
complete. Only in this way would his mediation be true
mediation. If he were some type of intermediate being his
presence would guide humanity not toward God, but away
from God, resulting in separation rather than mediation.133
As explained by Ratzinger, “[o]nly if he was really a man
like us can he be our mediator, and only if he is really God,
like God, does the mediation reach its goal.”134
In Incarnation theologies, being mediator (or
pathway) is an essential aspect of Christ’s liberation of
humanity. Ratzinger explains the theory as follows: Jesus
is the exemplary man, the Second Adam.135 The first
Adam, the moment when God’s Idea of man first took
shape, was but a first step in man’s process of becoming
man.136 The first step involved the transition from mere
life to mind. The second step, accomplished in Jesus, the
133

Id. at 163.
Id. at 166.
135
Holy Scripture refers to Jesus as the Second Adam. See id. at 236.
136
Ratzinger explains that, in the Bible, the word “Adam” expresses the
unity of the whole creature “man.” Id. at 236.
134
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Second Adam, involved a more intense contact between
humanity and God.
Man came into existence out
of the “clay” at the moment
when a creature was no longer
merely “there” but, over and
above just being there and
filling his needs, was aware of
the whole. But this step,
through
which
logos,
understanding, mind, first
came into this world, is only
completed when the Logos
itself, the whole creative
meaning, and man merge into
each other.
Man’s full
“hominization” presupposes
God’s becoming man; only by
this event is the Rubicon
dividing the “animal” from the
“logical” finally crossed for
ever and the highest possible
development accorded to the
process
[of
humanity’s
137
creation].”
It is in Jesus Christ, then, that humanity has reached its
goal.138 It is openness to the infinite that is the true mark of
man, and man is most complete when he is one with the
infinite. Jesus is “true man” because the person that is part
and parcel of his human nature is one with God.
137

Id. at 235.
As Ratzinger has stated elsewhere: “We can say that God created the
universe in order to enter into a history of love with humankind.”
Ratzinger, The Meaning, supra note 82, at 30.

138
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It is important to appreciate two distinct aspects of
this Incarnation theory. First, it is grounded in the
understanding that there is one Divine Idea “man” that is
fulfilled in Jesus Christ.139 This key point was uniformly
held and taught by important and influential early Christian
thinkers.140 Ratzinger explicitly made this point in a 1981
Lenten homily entitled The Creation of the Human Being.
141
In that homily, Ratzinger explains that, in the biblical
account of Creation, God reveals much insight about this
Divine Idea:





Humanity is one Creation
from God’s one Good Earth.
The human being comes into
existence after God has
breathed his breath into the
body, when divine reality
enters humanity—when God
enters into his Creation.
Because divine reality is in
humanity, each human being
is known and loved by God,
is willed, and is made in his
image.

139

Ratzinger makes this point only in passing in Ratzinger, Truth and
Freedom, supra note 26, at 351.
140
See HENRI DE LUBAC, CATHOLICISM: CHRIST AND THE COMMON
DESTINY OF MAN (Lacelot C. Sheppard & Sister Elizabeth Englund
trans., Ignatius Press 1988) (1947) (citing and extensively quoting from
the work of the Church Fathers and early Christian philosophers).
Notably, Lubac’s work greatly influenced Ratzinger’s approach to faith
and theology.
141
JOSEPH RATZINGER, The Creation of the Human Being, in IN THE
BEGINNING . . .: A CATHOLIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE STORY OF
CREATION AND THE FALL, supra note 82, at 41-58 [hereinafter
Ratzinger, The Creation].
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Each human being realizes
the One project of God, and
has his or her origin in the
same Creative Idea of God.
To be the image of God
implies an inherent capacity
for relationship and capacity
for God.
The distinctive mark of the
human being is the capability
to think and to pray; humans
are beings of word and
love—beings moving toward
Another.142

Jesus is the exemplary man or Last Adam because, in Jesus,
the person inherent to his human nature is integrated with
his divinity and is completely open to God. God’s one Idea
“man” has thus achieved the goal of being completely open
to God.
This tells us about God’s goal for each human
being. The “true man”—the man conforming with the
Divine Idea “man”—is a person in union with God in a
manner akin to Jesus, but in a manner that is only possible
in and through Jesus. And this leads to the second
important aspect of the Incarnation theory. It helps clarify
how it is that Jesus Christ enables humanity to achieve
God’s goal.
In the article Retrieving the Tradition, Ratzinger
points out that in integrating knowledge about the human
person with knowledge of Christ, two main ideas emerge.
One is the idea that the human person in history is “being
on the way” towards fuller integration into Divine Love.
The second idea has bearing on how Jesus enables
142

Id. at 44-48.
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humanity, as a unity, to achieve God’s goal. Jesus Christ is
the all-encompassing space in which the “we” of human
beings gather on the way to the Father, into which the Holy
Spirit, Love, gathers humanity.143
The vision, then, is one in which the Holy Spirit
(the means through which Jesus Christ remains present in
history) is within human beings, enabling and enhancing
the inherent human capacity to love God and the inherent
relativity (Love) within human beings. In turn, that Love
within human beings is held together in unity and in the
space, openness, or path that is Jesus Christ, thereby linking
united human love with God’s love.
As pointed out by Ratzinger, this vision necessarily
implies the collective nature of man’s union with God.
Love of God and love of neighbor are thus inherently and
inextricably intertwined. Within the human being there is a
reality consisting of relativity, Love. This relativity is
ultimately reaching for God. But it is affected by
interactions with others. Actions of “being-with” or
“being-for” others enhances the movement towards God
and vice versa. The collective nature of humanity’s union
with God means that the action of any one person affects
the union of others with God. Actions of “being-with” or
“being-for” by any individual enhance the overall
movement towards God; negative actions by any individual
have a negative effect on the whole of humanity’s
movement towards God.
In humanity, then, from the beginning, heaven and
earth touch. In Jesus Christ the creation of humanity is
brought to completion. The pathway between heaven and
earth is fully opened, and all integration or union between
God and humanity—the one Divine Idea—will be by way
of the divine person Jesus. Thus, Jesus is “the way, and the
truth, and the life" (Jn 14:6). Jesus is the pathway that each
143

See supra notes 113 to 122 and accompanying text.
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human being must endeavor to follow during his or her
lifetime in history. By following Jesus Christ in one’s
lifetime, one becomes, in reality, encompassed within
Jesus’s one saving action.144 Each individual is saved only
within the context of the whole. Moreover, by virtue of
being integrated with God, the plurality within the human
unity—a multi-unity in Love—contributes to the fullness of
the oneness of God.
D. Reprise of the Vision
As demonstrated by the foregoing subsection, the
Christian vision of freedom has layers of complexity. The
deeper the reflection is pushed—the more one uses human
reasoning to assist in understanding God’s revelation—the
more it becomes apparent that how freedom is used is
important.
The Christian vision is based on an
understanding of humanity and its history and destiny as
revealed by God. Human freedom depends on God and is
freedom from sin. This is so because the Creator of
humanity is Reason and Love. Each human being is a
distinct being set free by the Creative Logos that is Love.
Human life—the living out the freedom given by God—
should be a response to God. That response is guided by
and made possible by God, both by virtue of inherent
capacities within the human person and by virtue of God’s
144

In discussing Christian worship, which encompasses the entirety of
one’s life, Ratzinger explains: “The fundamental principle of Christian
worship is consequently this movement of exodus with its two-in-one
direction toward God and fellowman. By carrying humanity to God,
Christ incorporates it in his salvation. . . . [H]e who was crucified has
smelted the body of humanity into the Yes of worship. [Christian
sacrifice] is completely ‘anthropocentric’, entirely related to man,
because it was radical theocentricity, delivery of the ’I‘ and therefore of
the creature man to God. . . . The fundamental principle of sacrifice is
not destruction but love.” Ratzinger, Introduction, supra note 77, at
289.
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revelation, especially the fullness of revelation in Jesus
Christ.
In particular, love is a capacity, an existential
capacity that is itself a reality. Love is a transcendent
character within humans designed to reach beyond self,
especially towards God but also towards other human
beings. The purpose and goal of this capacity in the human
person is re-union with God, which depends on acting in
accord with God, which means acting in accord with the
truth at both the individual and collective levels. It is this
union with the transcendent that the human spirit is striving
for and that gives rise to the human yearning for freedom.
It is this inherent capacity to seek God that is the truly
distinguishing characteristic of humanity.
Union with the Creator depends on thinking and
acting in conformity with Eternal Reason and Love. In
practice, this means being receptive to God and other and
acting in conformity with the fundamental anthropological
pattern: being-from, being-with, and being-for. This is the
meaning or intelligibility within man, and it is acting
consistently with the meaning internal to man that
constitutes genuine human freedom.145 The inviolable
standards necessary for democratic society must be
standards that safeguard genuine human freedom.
Christian values provide just this type of standard. They
are values that have their origin from the Creator of
humanity and the world and are fully consistent with the

145

Because human freedom depends on grace, the Church and its
sacraments, especially baptism and penance and the Eucharist,
generally are crucial to attaining freedom. The capacity to love God
and remain in communion with him is dramatically enhanced by
reception of grace through the sacraments. For example, Ratzinger has
described the Eucharistic community as a “holy thing” granted to the
Church as the “real bond of unity.” See Ratzinger, Introduction, supra
note 77, at 334. Further, the Church is to be understood as the “center
of the Spirit’s activity in the world.” Id. at 335-36.
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pattern of love, the pattern of being-from, being-with, and
being-for.
V. Ordering Freedom in Accord with the Human
Spirit and Democratic Ideals
The well-reasoned alternative vision of human
freedom presented by Ratzinger clarifies the argument that
freedom is promoted and safeguarded only when core
Christian moral insights provide the point of reference for
law and justice. As noted at the outset, Ratzinger has
supplemented his argument with analysis of why prevalent
political theories of the modern era have failed. Part I of
this article presented part of Ratzinger’s assessment of the
shortcomings of modernity’s radical notion of human
freedom. This part of the article highlights another aspect
of the assessment, namely, that modernity’s typical
approach to freedom has missed its mark precisely because
of its failure to be guided by the fundamental pattern of
love imprinted within every human being. It then briefly
discusses certain aspects of how use of fundamental
Christian insights can be fully consistent with key ideals
held in a pluralistic democratic society.
A. Modern Ideas of Freedom Are in Opposition
to the Essence of the Human Person
In Truth and Freedom,146 published in 1996,
Ratzinger identifies fundamental elements of modern
approaches to freedom 147 and shows that these elements
146

Ratzinger, Truth and Freedom, supra note 26, at 337-53.
Ratzinger traces the evolution from Luther’s struggle for freedom of
conscience in the religious sphere; to the middle phrase characterized
by Kant’s call to use “pure reason,” and where two distinct approaches
emerged: a natural rights orientation grounded in a metaphysical idea,
and a radical anarchic approach wherein no right order exists in nature

147
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tend to allow humans to act in opposition to the internal
striving of the human spirit. Ratzinger’s analysis supports
the vision that freedom is inherently linked to truth and,
specifically, the truth regarding the essence of human
existence.
He shows that modernity’s anarchical
conception of freedom cannot be correct because it allows
humans to regard the “fundamental figure of human
existence” as itself an attack on freedom.
Ratzinger’s analysis is based on the principle that
the fundamental pattern of human existence is a being
“from,” “with,” and “for” another. 148 Ratzinger points out
(arising from Rousseau’s ideas); to the later Marxist approaches. Id. at
340-43. He concludes that the widespread view of freedom today is
characterized by the individualistic ideology which was a component of
all Enlightenment thought by anarchic tendencies (human will is the
sole norm of human action) and by the Marxist tendency to rely on
structures and systems to bring about justice. Id. at 342-43. Despite
failures to bring about a sense of justice, Ratzinger notes that the
radical current of Enlightenment has not lost its appeal. Fascination for
the grand promise of emancipation made at the inception of modernity
remains. Id. at 344. To Ratzinger, then, the question “What is
freedom?” cannot be avoided and involves issues of “what man is and
how he can live rightly both individually and collectively.” Id. at 33840, 344.
148
Id. at 346. Notably, the philosophical or theological basis for
understanding human beings as “beings from, with, and for” is
suggested only in passing in Truth and Freedom. Ratzinger points to
the “hidden theological core” underlying the modern, anarchic
conception of freedom: the desire to be “like a god who depends on
nothing and no one, whose own freedom is not restricted by that of
another.” Id. at 347. But he also points to the theological error. In this
ideology the divinity is conceived as a pure egoism, which is the
extreme opposite of the real essence of God as revealed by God in
Jesus Christ. In Jesus, God has revealed himself as relational: “by his
very nature he is entirely being-for (Father), being-from (Son), and
being-with (Holy Spirit).” Id. at 347. For Ratzinger, this is the reason
why the essence of human existence follows the pattern. Resisting the
pattern leads to dehumanization, which will result in the destruction of
the human being through the destruction of the truth of the human
being. Id. at 347.
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that this fundamental anthropological pattern is most
starkly presented by the unborn child. The being of the
unborn child is only from and through the mother and can
survive only by physically being with the mother. The
“being-with” of the child prompts the being of the mother
to become a “being for.” Importantly, the pattern remains
after the child is born. The outward form of the “beingfrom and -with” may change as the child matures. The
child nonetheless remains dependent; and although the
mother may assign the care of the child to another, there
remains “a ‘from’ that demands a ‘for.’”149 Furthermore,
Ratzinger points out that this pattern remains even in
adults: “Even the adult can exist only with and from
another, and is thus continually thrown back on that beingfor which is the very thing he would like to shut out.”150

149

Id. at 346.
Id. at 346. Notably, this important point—the all-encompassing
nature of the “from” and “for” pattern—is illustrated more thoroughly
by Ratzinger in other writings. Ratzinger links the pattern to
humanity’s corporality, i.e., his being “spirit in body.” See Ratzinger,
Introduction, supra note 77.
Corporality necessitates physical
dependence on those immediately surrounding a human being
(including both parentage and mutual daily care); but this dependence
extends to needs of the spirit in man and, as well, extends to
dependence on the past and future of mankind. By way of example, he
points to the human need for language (to which the whole of history
has contributed); for culture (the “web of history that impinges on the
individual through speech and social communication”); and for a future
(“man is a being who lives for the future, who continually takes care to
plan ahead beyond the passing moment and could no longer exist if he
suddenly found himself without a future”). Id. at 245-48.
Another important insight on the human need for other was
made by Ratzinger in a 1981 Lenten homily: “Human beings have their
selves not only in themselves but also outside of themselves: they live
in those whom they love and in those who love them and to whom they
are ‘present.’” See JOSEPH RATZINGER, Sin and Salvation, in IN THE
BEGINNING . . .: A CATHOLIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE STORY OF
CREATION AND THE FALL, supra note 82, at 72.
150
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Ratzinger then focuses on the fact that man in
contemporary society mightily resists this fundamental
pattern. “[M]an quite spontaneously takes for granted the
being-for of others in the form of today’s network of
service systems, yet if he had his way he would prefer not
to be forced to participate in such a “from” and “for,” but
would like to become wholly independent, and to be able to
do and not to do just what he pleases.”151 Ratzinger notes
that it is this modern attitude or demand for freedom that is
reflected in society’s acceptance of abortion. “[A]bortion
appears as a right of freedom.” The woman “must have the
power to make decisions about her own life, and no one
else can – so we are told – impose from the outside any
ultimately binding norm.”152 Ratzinger’s point of emphasis
is that, from the modern perspective of freedom, requiring a
woman to act in accord with the basic anthropologic pattern
is perceived as an attack on freedom.153 This example
supports Ratzinger’s key argument that a conception of
freedom that demands liberation from the very essence of
what it means to be human simply cannot be correct. As he
states, “exactly what sort of freedom has the right to annul
another’s freedom as soon as it begins?”154
Genuine human freedom, therefore, cannot rest on
the individualistic model of radical autonomy and selfsufficiency. The complex weave of human dependencies
does not allow this approach. Rather, Ratzinger explains,
“Man’s freedom is shared freedom, freedom in the conjoint
existence of liberties that limit and thus sustain one
151

Ratzinger, Truth and Freedom, supra note 26, at 346-47.
Id. at 346.
153
Id. at 347.
154
That society would allow real but secondary interests to prevail over
the fundamental right to life also shows that modernity’s decision to
restrict reason results in reason being used to justify the irrational.
JOSEPH RATZINGER, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CRISIS OF CULTURES 63
(2006).
152
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another.”155 This conception of freedom thus necessarily
requires a right or just ordering of rights and relationships:
an “ordered communion of freedoms.”156 This sort of
“right ordering” requires laws in society that are grounded
in standards or values that foster human action consistent
with the truth regarding the essence of human existence.
This reference to “right ordering” in Truth and Freedom is
very similar to a statement expressed in the Instruction on
Christian Freedom and Liberation issued by the
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith:
Truth and justice are therefore
the measure of true freedom. .
. . Far from being achieved in
total self-sufficiency and an
absence
of
relationships,
freedom only truly exists
where
reciprocal
bonds,
governed by truth and justice,
link people to one another.
But for such bonds to be
possible, each person must
live in the truth.157
This is, then, but another way of saying that each person
must live in conformity with the intelligibility within man,
the pattern of “being-from,” “being-with,” and “being-for.”

155

Ratzinger, Truth and Freedom, supra note 26, at 348.
Id. at 352.
157
ICFL, supra note 44, at #26. In Truth and Freedom, Ratzinger
shows that freedom is enhanced by heightened awareness of
responsibility and acceptance of ever greater fraternal bonds and that
responsibility, living in response to what the human being is in truth,
entails being guided by the Decalogue, unfolded in rational
understanding. Ratzinger, Truth and Freedom, supra note 26, at 34951.
156
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B. Ordering Freedom in Love Is Consistent with
Democratic Ideals
Ratzinger’s vision for protecting freedom in society
rests on three points. First, freedom is safeguarded only
when democratic government and the majority vote are
limited by inviolable moral standards.
Second,
safeguarding genuine freedom—freedom consistent with
the internal yearning for the transcendent—requires that the
inviolable standards be consistent with the intelligibility
within man—the “being-from,” “being-with,” and “beingfor” pattern impressed on the human spirit by virtue of
being a creature of God. Third, core Christian insights and
values properly used to inform the ordering of relationships
in society can achieve this requisite conformity to Eternal
Reason and Love. As noted, this “right ordering” requires
laws in society that are grounded in standards or values that
foster human action consistent with the truth. Further,
although Ratzinger agrees with the idea of a secular state,
he advocates that the State has a role in prudently fostering
respect for those values, including expecting reverence and
respect for God and holy things, and encouraging serious
study of questions such as the existence of and nature of
This vision remains consistent with key
God.158
158

See, e.g., Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra note 12, at 21820. A key reason for this type of state action is the need for sufficient
unity among the citizens regarding the values deemed inviolable. See
Ratzinger, Freedom and Constraint, supra note 21, at 188
(“Ultimately, the democratic system can only function if certain
fundamental values . . . are recognized as valid by everyone . . . an
ethos which is jointly accepted and maintained even if its rational basis
cannot be established absolutely and conclusively”). See also
Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra note 12, at 205 (“[Pluralist
democracy, in itself, does not] unite[] its citizens in a fundamental
assent to the state;” for its foundations, it depends on other powers and
forces outside of itself); Ratzinger, Luther, supra note 21, at 131
(noting that “a formal unity without clear content is fundamentally no
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democratic ideals. It is beyond the scope of this article to
discuss this point in detail, but it is important to recognize
that Ratzinger has addressed this concern.
From a practical perspective, Ratzinger recognizes
the need to adhere to two key principles in carrying out the
exchange between politics and faith. First, he readily
acknowledges the need to maintain the properly distinct
and delimited spheres of Church and State.159 Ratzinger
notes that the Christian faith brought about the secular
state, a society in which the political realm is limited and
provides space for freedom of conscience.160 The State is
responsible for peace and justice, and governs on the basis

unity at all; unity based on common skepticism and not knowledge is,
in essence, based on capitulation).
Ratzinger is clear, however, in placing the primary
responsibility for cultivating the spiritual foundation of society on the
Church and Christians. Id. See also JOSEPH RATZINGER, Freedom,
Law, and the Good, in VALUES IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL 52 (2006)
(emphasizing the public task of Christian churches in that they must be
free “to address the freedom of all human beings so the moral forces of
history may remain forces in the present”); JOSEPH RATZINGER,
Biblical Aspects of the Question of Faith and Politics, in CHURCH,
ECUMENISM & POLITICS: NEW ESSAYS IN ECCLESIOLOGY, supra note
12, at 147, 151 [hereinafter Ratzinger, Biblical Aspects] (The core
responsible political activity is to nurture public acceptance of the
validity of morality and God’s commandments.).
159
See, e.g., Ratzinger, Political Stance, supra note 13, at 161-62
(noting that “[w]here the Church itself becomes the state, freedom
becomes lost.” But freedom is also lost when the Church is precluded
from being a public and publically relevant authority).
160
See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, Conscience in Its Age, in CHURCH,
ECUMENISM & POLITICS: NEW ESSAYS IN ECCLESIOLOGY, supra note
12, at 165, 174 [hereinafter Ratzinger, Conscience] (noting that, by
altering the ancient practice of state authority over religion, Jesus set a
limit to earthly authority and proclaimed the freedom of the person that
transcends all political systems); Ratzinger, Biblical Aspects, supra
note 158, at 148-49; JOSEPH RATZINGER, Searching for Peace, in
VALUES IN A T IME OF UPHEAVAL 114 (2006).
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of reason.161 But Church and State have a common moral
responsibility based on the essence of man and the essence
of justice.162 Thus, although politics is the realm of reason,
Ratzinger emphasizes that political reason must include
moral reason.163 Further, it cannot be limited to mere
technological and calculating reason, a reason that has cut
off its historical roots, namely, the basic memory of
Because of modernity’s self-imposed
mankind.164
narrowing of reason, the evidential character of a
fundamental intuition common to all the great cultures has
been eroded, namely, the conviction regarding:
[T]he doctrine of objective
values expressed in the Being
of the world; the belief that
attitudes exist that correspond
to the message of the universe
and are true and therefore
good, and that other attitudes
161

See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, Searching for Peace, in VALUES IN A
TIME OF UPHEAVAL 22-24 (2006)..
162
See, e.g., id. at 114. Ratzinger frequently explains that the essence
of justice depends on a universal criterion, as opposed to merely
pragmatic criteria determined by the group or by majority vote. See,
e.g., Ratzinger, A Turning Point, supra note 11, at 133-37 (noting that,
in Greek and Roman philosophy of the state, a state that constructs
justice only on the basis of majority opinions sinks down to the level of
the “robber band”).
163
See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, NEED ARTICLE NAME, in VALUES
IN A T IME OF UPHEAVAL 24 (2006); Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation,
supra note 12, 216-17.
164
See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CRISIS OF
CULTURES 36-43 (2006) (explaining the confused ideology of freedom
that has resulted from modern philosophy’s tendency to limit reason to
what is considered objectively verifiable fact, and to see issues only in
terms of feasibility, functionality, and effectiveness and characterizing
such an approach to reasoning as being radically opposed to all other
historical cultures of humanity).
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likewise exist that are
genuinely and always false
because they contradict Being.
. . . [and thus] the conviction
that man’s Being contains an
imperative; the conviction that
he does not himself invent
morality on the basis of
calculations of expediency but
rather finds it already present
in the essence of things.165
In governing, the State should make full use of reason’s
capacity to discern the moral message—the intelligible
meaning—within creation. And, in doing so, the State
should recognize that the discernment process is greatly
assisted by the insights of faith.166
For its part, the Church’s primary role is to
evangelize and bring about the inner conversion of
165

Ratzinger, A Turning Point, supra note 11, at 34-36 (emphasis in
original).
166
Ratzinger explains that modernity’s self-limitation of reason has
meant that what is most specific to man—moral reasoning—has been
unjustifiably delimited to the subjective realm. He notes that, in reality,
reason can perceive more than quantitative facts. Creation reveals a
moral message that is discernible by use of reason, especially when
assisted by faith and when it draws upon the experience of human
existence over time. Full use of moral reasoning is reasoning in the
highest sense. The imposed limitation of reason to quantifiable facts
precludes the scientific method from attaining its aim of garnering
knowledge most in accord with reality; and, conversely, full use of
reason’s capabilities will more readily attain knowledge in accord with
reality. Thus, “the great ethical insights of mankind are just as rational
and just as true as—indeed, more true than—the experimental
knowledge of the realm of the natural sciences and technology. They
are more true, because they touch more deeply the essential character
of Being and have a more decisive significance for the humanity of
man.” Id. at 37-42.
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individuals. The political and economic running of society
is not a direct part of the Church’s mission, but Jesus
“entrusted to [the Church] the word of truth which is
capable of enlightening consciences.”167 The power of the
Gospel, as lived by convicted Christians, can “penetrate[]
the human community and its history,” thereby purifying
and sustaining a culture of life consistent with the
This includes nurturing the idea of
Beatitudes.168
conscience as recognition of man as creation, thereby
fostering respect for the Creator in man as opposed to the
more common notion of conscience being a wholly
independent internal forum for deciding what is good or
evil.169 But the Church in various institutional forms, and
especially in and through the activities of individuals, can
and also must make claims and demands on public law.170
167

ICFL, supra note 44, at #61.
Id. at #62. See also ICATL, supra not 44, at ch. XI, #8 (“[I]t is only
by making appeal to the ‘moral potential’ of the person and to the
constant need for interior conversion, that social change will be brought
about which will be truly in the service of man. For it will only be in
the measure that they collaborate freely in these necessary changes
through their own initiative and in solidarity, that people, awakened to
a sense of their responsibility, will grow in humanity. The inversion of
morality and structures is steeped in a materialist anthropology which is
incompatible with the dignity of mankind”).
169
See Ratzinger, Conscience, supra note 160, at 169-70 (quoting
Reinhold Schneider: “Conscience is knowledge of responsibility for the
whole of creation and before him who has made it.”). Ratzinger agrees
that a person must follow a clear verdict of conscience, but stresses that
this must be understood in conjunction with the reality that conscience
cannot be identified with a person’s subjective certainty about himself
and his moral conduct (this would in fact enslave persons by making
them dependent on prevailing opinions of the day), and also that
conscience can err. See JOSEPH RATZINGER, If You Want Peace. . . , in
VALUES IN A T IME OF UPHEAVAL 75-100 (2006).
170
See Ratzinger, Political Stance, supra note 13, at 163 (noting that
“the Church cannot simply retreat into the private sphere”). In
addition, the Church has societal function. As explained by Ratzinger
in Introduction to Christianity, the Church and being Christian relate to
168
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In making demands on the public law, however,
Ratzinger emphasizes the need to focus on essential core
values bearing on freedom. This is the second key
principle to keep in mind in carrying out the exchange
between politics and faith. It is an important way of
preventing overreaching that would upset a proper ChurchState balance. At times Ratzinger points to certain core
essentials, namely, human dignity and human rights
grounded in man as the image of God; marriage, and
family, grounded in the truth of the human person; and
reverence for God and to that which is holy to other
persons.171 More often, Ratzinger points to the Decalogue
as a starting point, because it constitutes a “sublime
expression” of moral reason and, as such, coincides in
many ways with the great ethical traditions of other
religions.172 To Ratzinger, respect for the Creator in man
entails living “as an answer – as a response to what we are
in truth.”173 And the Decalogue, with its origin from the
Creator, is a “self-presentation and self-exhibition of God,”
and thus a “luminous manifestation of his truth.”174
Notably, he stresses the need to continually unfold the
meaning of the Decalogue, recognizing that coming to
appreciate the whole of the truth requires an active process
in which “reason’s entire quest for the criteria of our

the fact that each human must work out his freedom within the
“framework of the already existing whole of human life that stamps and
molds him;” their purpose is “to save history as history and to break
through or transform the collective grid that forms the site of human
existence.” Ratzinger, Introduction, supra note 77, 247-48.
171
See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, Europe’s Identity, in VALUES IN A
TIME OF UPHEAVAL 147-49 (2006).
172
See JOSEPH RATZINGER, To Change or Preserve, in VALUES IN A
TIME OF UPHEAVAL 29 (2006).
173
See Ratzinger, Truth and Freedom, supra note 26, at 349-51.
174
Id.
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responsibility truly comes into its own.”175 To Ratzinger,
this is simply part and parcel of Christianity’s synthesis of
faith and reason: reason needs faith, but faith also, precisely
as faith, must work in conjunction with reason.176
Ratzinger also is convinced that judicious use of
core Christian insights and values to inform the ordering of
relationships in society helps maintain full consistency with
notions of tolerance. His reasoning on this issue has two
aspects to it. First, Ratzinger has explained that use of
Christian insights as the inviolable point of reference for
law and justice in society should not be considered an
unjust imposition of values. The insights reflect the
intelligibility in things or the meaning or truth in Creation.
And, as explained by Ratzinger, there is in man—at the
ontological level—an expectation of sorts, a primal
knowledge or remembrance of the good and true that needs
help from without to become aware of its own self.177 This
is the ontological level of the human conscience. He
explains:
This anamnesis of our origin,
resulting from the fact that our
being is constitutively in
keeping with God, is not a
175

Id. (noting that freedom is enhanced by heightened awareness of
responsibility—living in response to what the human being is in truth—
which entails being guided by the Decalogue, unfolded in rational
understanding).
176
Ratzinger has explained the relationship between faith and reason as
follows: “[F]aith demands and reveals reason, understands itself as the
environment of reason, so that faith is not correct if the insights to
which it leads are not at least rudimentarily reasonable, while on the
other hand reason cuts the ground from beneath its feet if it does away
with faith.” Ratzinger, Political Stance, supra note 13, at 158.
177
JOSEPH RATZINGER, If You Want Peace: Conscience and Truth, in
VALUES IN A T IME OF UPHEAVAL 90-95 (2006) (explaining the classical
concept of synderesis as anamnesis of the Creator existing at the
ontological level of conscience).
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knowledge articulated in
concepts, a treasure store of
retrievable contents. It is an
inner sense, a capacity for
recognition, in such a way that
the one addressed recognizes
in himself an echo of what is
said to him. If he does not
hide from his own self, he
comes to the insight: this is
the goal toward which my
whole being tends, this is
where I want to go. This
anamnesis of the Creator,
which is identical with the
foundations of our existence,
is the reason that mission is
both possible and justified.178
This primal knowledge, of course, can become distorted or
greatly weakened by culture. Nonetheless, when the
Church or others present and explain Christian values, it
can spark recognition. This is not an imposition, but,
rather, there is a fusion that activates the capacity to receive
the truth.179
Second, because Christian insights and values are
grounded in Love, their use as the inviolable reference
should not lead to inappropriate intolerance for other
perspectives. Rather, as explained by Ratzinger, the surest
guarantee of tolerance is the identity of Truth and Love.
On the one hand this means that, in an appropriate praxis of
freedom, the evangelical mission of the Church and
Christians will be carried out with Love, which necessarily
implies respect for religious liberty freedom in civil
178
179

Id. at 92.
Id. at 92-94.
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society.180 On a deeper level, however, the identity of
Truth and Love suggests that typical notions of tolerance
reflect confusion about the meaning of genuine human
freedom. The typical idea of tolerance is that it is the
attitude of respect for the views of others that safeguards
freedom.181 From the Christian perspective of human
freedom, it is the use of core Christian values or insights as
a point of reference for law and justice that is itself the
safeguard for freedom. Tolerance is simply the appropriate
attitude to have since matters of conscience should not be
coerced. This is a subtle but real distinction. The
persuasiveness of Ratzinger’s view—as to both aspects of
notions of tolerance—is tied to careful and prudent use of
essential core values.
180

See JOSEPH RATZINGER, TRUTH AND TOLERANCE: CHRISTIAN
BELIEF AND WORLD RELIGIONS 231 (Henry Taylor trans., Ignatius
Press 1st Am. ed. 2004). See also Letter from Benedict XVI, Supreme
Pontiff, to the Bishops, Priests, and Deacons; Men and Women
Religious; and all the Lay Faithful on Christian Love, (June 29, 2009)
(on
file
with
author),
available
at
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents
/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-in-veritate_en.html, at #2 (noting
that “[t]ruth needs to be sought, found and expressed with the
‘economy’ of charity, but charity in its turn needs to be understood,
confirmed and practiced in the light of the truth”). See also Declaration
on Religious Freedom (DIGNITATIS HUMANAE): On the Right of the
Person and of Communities to Social and Civil Freedom in Matters
Religious), promulgated by Pope Paul VI, December 7, 1965 (available
at
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/docume
nts/vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html) (last accessed
4/28/2014).
181
For example, in a law review article calling for the abandonment of
the neutrality principle, Dean Steven Smith explains that the
“restoration of tolerance” as a “respectable attitude” is justified. He
explains that tolerance – respect for the views of those who disagree
with the substantive values selected by society – will protect their
liberty. See Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 Calif.
L. Rev. 305 (1990).
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Ratzinger has thus addressed the major concerns
that relate to use of core Christian insights as the inviolable
standard in a pluralistic democratic society. The Christian
vision, when fully and properly understood, remains
consistent with key democratic ideals.
V. Conclusion
A key purpose of this article has been to explain, in
a comprehensive way, a well-reasoned alternative
perspective of human freedom that brings to light the fact
that the doctrine of neutrality presents a real obstacle to
freedom in democratic society. A sound argument exists to
support the claim that liberty and justice in society depend
on state recognition of, and prudent use of, core Christian
values in lawmaking and policy-making.182 A strong case
has been made that judgments concerning the ends in life
worthy of pursuit are not solely subjective. Rather,
freedom is an integral aspect of the human person, and,
thus, how freedom is used matters. The heart of the
message is that Christian values have their origin from the
transcendent and, more specifically, from the Creator of
humanity and the world. As such, these values are
necessarily consistent with the meaning or intelligibility in
creation and will thereby promote genuine human freedom.
Personal choices about how to live do matter, and it should
be permissible for the State—through prudent adherence to
core values—to foster a culture in which persons can more
readily live in a genuinely human way.
182

It is appropriate to reiterate that this would not necessarily mean a
return to state practices struck down by the Court due to Establishment
Clause concerns. Past reliance on Christian values in fashioning laws
may not always have been “prudent” and may have involved values
beyond the realm appropriately considered “core values.”
Cf.
Ratzinger, A Christian Orientation, supra note 12, at 212 (noting that
Christians have at times in the past expected too much from the
“earthly city”).
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From this alternative perspective, the essence of
human freedom is being receptive to God the Creator, and
acting consistent with the pattern impressed on the human
spirit by virtue of being a creature of God.183 This view of
freedom is of course intimately bound-up with belief in
God. But the counter-perspective—the view associated
with the radial philosophy of freedom and, ultimately, the
principle of liberal neutrality—similarly has a theological
basis, namely, the rejection of belief in God the Creator.184
A rejection that is played out by the banishment of ideas
related to religion and morality to the subjective realm.185
Indeed, in Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures, Ratzinger
emphasized that the ultimate divide in contemporary
society rests on the question of the existence of God:
The real antagonism typical of
today’s world is not that
between diverse religious
cultures; rather, it is the
antagonism
between
the
183

Indeed, Ratzinger has stated that “[i]f there is no longer any
obligation to which [man] can and must respond in freedom, then there
is no longer any realm of freedom at all.” Ratzinger, A Turning Point,
supra note 11, at 41.
184
Ratzinger has explained that behind the radical philosophy of
freedom “there stands a programme which must ultimately be labeled
theological: God is no longer recognized as a reality standing over
against man, but instead man may himself or herself become what he or
she imagines a divinity would be if it existed. . . .” Ratzinger, Freedom
and Liberation, supra note 24, at 260.
185
See, e.g., Ratzinger, A Turning Point, supra note 11, at 33-41
(noting that the consequence of materialism and the narrowing of
reason is that “[m]orality, just like religion, now belongs to the realm of
the subjective. If it is subjective, then it is something posited by man.
It does not precede vis-à-vis us: we precede it and fashion it. This
movement of [separating the world of feelings and the world of facts] .
. . essentially knows no limits. . . . Calculation rules, and power rules.
Morality has surrendered.”).
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radical emancipation of man
from God, from the roots of
life, on the one hand, and the
great religious cultures, on the
other.
If we come to
experience a clash of cultures .
. . . [it] will be between this
radical emancipation of man
and the great historical
cultures. Accordingly, [the
strategy of using constitutions
to keep God out of the public
realm] is not the expression of
tolerance that wishes to
protect
the
non-theistic
religions and the dignity of
atheists and agnostics; rather,
it is the expression of a
consciousness that would like
to see God eradicated once
and for all from the public life
of humanity and shut up in the
subjective sphere of cultural
residues from the past. In this
way relativism, which is the
starting point of the whole
becomes
a
process,
dogmatism that believes itself
in possession of the definitive
knowledge of human reason,
with the right to consider
everything else merely as a
stage in human history that is
basically
obsolete
and
deserves to be relativized. In
reality, this means that we
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have need of roots if we are to
survive and that we must not
lose sight of God if we do not
want human dignity to
disappear.186
This is strong language from a respected political thinker,
and the relativism of which he speaks is simply another
way of discussing neutrality. In the Crisis of Cultures and
other writings, Ratzinger has addressed the reasonableness
of belief in creation187 and the reasonableness of faith.188
186

JOSEPH RATZINGER, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CRISIS OF CULTURES 44
(2006) (The phrase “the strategy of using constitutions to keep God out
of the public realm” was substituted for the phrase “the refusal to refer
to God in the Constitution,” in which Ratzinger was referring to the
European constitution).
187
For example, Ratzinger has explained that belief in Creation is
reasonable, and, further, that “even from the perspective of the data of
the natural sciences it is the ‘better hypothesis,’ offering a fuller and
better explanation than any of the other theories.” See Ratzinger, God
the Creator, supra note 82, at 17. In the second homily, Ratzinger
explains that the scientific-based theories hinge on the entire ensemble
of nature arising out of errors and dissonances and that some scientists
acknowledge the absurdness of the theories but, nonetheless, cannot
break out of the scientific mindset because “the scientific method
demands that a question not be permitted to which the answer would
have to be God.” Ratzinger, The Meaning, supra note 82, at 22-25.
188
In Crisis of Cultures, Ratzinger explains that science cannot prove
that God does not exist, and, if a person searches for God, certainty can
be reached as to God’s existence. The assurance arises in part the way
faith in other aspects of a technology-based society arises: we place
trust in others who are qualified, credible and have knowledge when
the validity of that trust is verified in daily experiences. A relationship
with God always involves relationship with other humans. Over time,
the living encounter with others that is inherently part of faith (the
encounter with God and other humans) leads to certainty. Faith is
transformed to knowledge. “The experience builds and comes to
possess an evidentiary character that assures us.” JOSEPH RATZINGER,
CHRISTIANITY AND THE CRISIS OF CULTURES 79-82, 103-110 (2006).
Ratzinger notes that seeking knowledge of God is not irrational.

73

Spring 2014| Volume 9 | Issue 3
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 431
In light of the failures of the modern political freedom
movements and the thorough and well-reasoned case
supporting the prudent use of core Christian values in
democratic society, it is reasonable to conclude that a more
moderate use of neutrality principles will better safeguard
liberty and justice.

Rather, what is being sought is actually the very foundation of
rationality. Id. at 89-90.
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